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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Even the most analytical thinkers are predictably irrational; the
really smart ones acknowledge and address their irrationalities.”
Dan Ariely
Behavioral Economist
1.1 Motivation
Standard economic theory relies on the neoclassical assumption that individuals are fully
rational and purely self-interested. It assumes that decision makers undertake optimal decisions
that maximize their own profits. As early as 1955, Simon criticized these assumptions and
argues that human decision makers have limited cognitive capabilities and are prone to
decision biases. He proposes satisficing as a more accurate way to model their behavior and
refers to this approach as bounded rationality (Simon 1955, 1957). Simon (1959) recommends
that economists should incorporate psychological evidence on individual behavior and that
theories of decision making should be grounded in an empirically founded theory of choice
that take the cognitive processes into account. The idea of bounded rationality of human
decision makers began to impact economics as the first controlled laboratory experiments in
decision making started to take place in the early 1960’s. Pioneering work of Vernon Smith
(1962, 1976) laid the ground for publishing research in experimental economics (Charness
and Halladay 2017). Ever since, the field of experimental economics has seen exponential
1
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growth every decade (Roth 1995). At the same time the field of behavioral economics has also
grown in popularity and has developed new behavioral theory and models to explain the gaps
between established economic theory and experimental results (Bendoly et al. 2006). Once an
academic niche, behavioral and experimental economics have gained momentum in the late
1980’s and early 1990’s (Charness and Halladay 2017), approximately ten years after Herbert
Simon received the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1978 “for his pioneering research into the
decision-making process within economic organizations” (The Royal Swedish Academy of
Sciences 1978).
Another broad approach to address bounded rationality started in the late 1960’s by the
seminal work of Tversky and Kahneman (1971, 1974), now known as the heuristics and
biases approach (Kahneman and Frederick 2002). Tversky and Kahneman (1971) propose
that when humans face complex decisions they often apply simple decision heuristics, such as
the representativeness heuristic, the availability heuristic, and the anchoring and adjustment
heuristic. These decision heuristics are simple rules of thumb that lead to systematic biases
in judgment and decision making. Various researchers have contributed to that research
stream and identified a large number of heuristics and biases in human decision making.
Behavioral economists like Richard Thaler have started to incorporate behavioral insights
into economic science. In 2002, Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith co-received the Nobel
Prize in Economics “for integrating insights from psychology into economic science” and
for establishing “laboratory experiments as a vital tool in empirical economic analysis”,
respectively (The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2002). They played a central role in
establishing behavioral and experimental economics as part of mainstream economics.
In the new millennium, both behavioral and experimental economics become useful tools
to design government policies. Before policy makers only rarely used psychological insights or
relied on theoretical predictions (Charness and Halladay 2017). After Thaler and Sunstein
(2008) published their influential book Nudge in 2008, behavioral economists have become
increasingly influential as policy advisors. Many governments have formed groups composed
of behavioral and experimental economists to incorporate insights from academic research
in behavioral science into the design of more effective policy solutions. In 2010 the British
2
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Figure 1.1 Nudge Units Around the World (adapted from Chen et al. 2017)
Finland: Prime
Minister’s Office
Australia: Behavioural
Economics Team of the 
Australian Government 
(BETA)
Singapore: Prime 
Minister’s Office and 
Ministry of Manpower 
UK: (i) The Behavioural
Insights Team (BIT) and 
(ii) nudge units in 14 
departments
European 
Commission: 
Foresight, Behavioural
Insights and Design for 
Policy Unit
US: Social and 
Behavioral Sciences 
Team
Canada: Behavioural
Insights Unit
Rio de Janeiro: 
Mayor’s Office
France: OECD 
Behavioural science 
coordination
Melbourne: 
Department or Premier 
and Cabinet, Victoria
Italy: Prime Minister’s 
Committee of Experts
Germany: German 
Federal Chancellery
Moldova: UNDO/BIT 
collaboration
Sydney: (i) 
Behavioural
Insights Team 
Australia and (ii) 
Behavioural
Insights Unit, 
New South Wales
Jamaica: Finance 
Ministry (UNDP/BIT)
World Bank: Global 
Insights Initiative (GIN)
Chicago:
Chicago Nudge Unit
New York City: (i) BIT 
North America and (ii) 
ideas42
Netherlands: (i) Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and (ii) 
Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment
India: New BE unit
Mexico: President’s 
Office
Norway: 
Greenudge
Guatemala: Guatemala 
tax administration
Denmark: The Danish 
Nudging Network
government was the first to establish its Behavioural Insights Team1, commonly referred to
as the “Nudge Unit”. In subsequent years, several governments around the world followed the
British government and formed their own nudge units, including Canada with its Behavioral
Insights Unit2, Germany with a team in the Federal Chancellery (Deutscher Bundestag
2015), and the United States, which established its Social and Behavioral Sciences Team
by President Obama’s executive order in 20153. Other initiatives around the world can be
seen in Figure 1.1. In 2017, Richard Thaler received the Nobel Prize in Economics “for his
contributions to behavioural economics” (The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2017).
Incorporating behavioral science insights has not been limited to economics, but has taken
place in other fields as well, such as accounting, finance, marketing, law, and, more recently,
strategy. Operations management was perhaps the last field of management studies to embrace
behavioral insights (Loch and Wu 2007). Before 2000, the field was dominated by formal
mathematical models and human behavior received little attention. This has changed rapidly
after the seminal paper of Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), who initiated the research stream
1http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/
2http://bi.dpc.nsw.gov.au/
3https://sbst.gov/
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of behavioral operations. They used laboratory experiments to analyze ordering behavior
in the newsvendor setting. The order quantities of their subjects deviated substantially
from profit maximizing order quantities and exhibited what has come to be known as the
“pull-to-center” effect, because observed average order quantities are consistently between
profit maximizing order quantities and mean demand. This effect was mainly attributed to
anchoring and insufficient adjustment (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971, Tversky and Kahneman
1974). Since the seminal paper of Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), the pull-to-center effect has
proven robust in more than 20 experimental studies (Zhang and Siemsen 2016), holding under
various demand distributions (Benzion et al. 2008, 2010) and observed and unobserved lost
sales (Rudi and Drake 2014) and persists with experience and training (Bolton and Katok
2008, Bolton et al. 2012) and decision frequency (Bolton and Katok 2008, Bostian et al. 2008,
Lurie and Swaminathan 2009).
Bostian et al. (2008) estimated an adaptive learning model (Camerer and Ho 1999) that
tracks the observed data patterns in their newsvendor experiment. Other proposed explana-
tions of the pull-to-center effect include bounded rationality (Su 2008), cognitive reflection
(Moritz et al. 2013), ex post inventory error minimization (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, Ho
et al. 2010, Kremer et al. 2014), overconfidence of decision makers (Ren and Croson 2013),
and impulse balance behavior (Ockenfels and Selten 2014, 2015). All of these theories offer
explanations for why learning is insufficient to move ordering fully away from the anchor at
mean demand to the optimal order quantity.
Behavioral operations has become a rapidly growing field. In the last decade, scholars
have incorporated insights from psychology and behavioral economics in sub-areas, such as
contracting (Katok et al. 2008, Katok and Wu 2009, Becker-Peth et al. 2013, Wu and Chen
2014), information sharing and forecasting (Özer et al. 2011, Kremer et al. 2011, Moritz
et al. 2014, Kremer et al. 2016, Bolton and Katok 2017), project management (Bendoly
and Swink 2007, Sting et al. 2015, Kagan et al. 2017), procurement (Engelbrecht-Wiggans
et al. 2007, Davis et al. 2011, Elmaghraby et al. 2012, Haruvy and Katok 2013, Davis et al.
2014), queuing (Batt and Terwiesch 2015, Kremer and Debo 2016, Shunko et al. 2017, Yu
et al. 2017), and revenue management (Bearden et al. 2008, Bendoly 2013, Kocabiyikoglu
4
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et al. 2015). Hopp (2004) speculates that behavioral factors could be the source of the next
paradigm shift within operations management. Like behavioral and experimental economics
enhanced and broadened the field of economics, behavioral operations enhances and broadens
the field of operations management.
1.2 Behavioral Economic Engineering
Bolton and Ockenfels (2012) defined economic engineering as “the science of designing real-
world institutions and mechanisms that align individual incentives and behavior with the
underlying goals”. Economic mechanisms play an important role in operations management.
For example, the design of procurement auctions, supply contracts, or incentive schemes
directly affect prices, order quantities, and the motivation and satisfaction of employees.
Mechanisms matter because they affect decision making. Incorporating insights from psy-
chology and behavioral economics into the design of mechanisms is important because actual
decision making deviates from standard economic theory in two ways:
1. Deviations from rationality (bounded rationality)
2. Deviations from selfishness (other regarding preferences)
In this dissertation we will focus on bounded rationality of human decision makers. Human
decision makers are often guided by simple rules of thumb that are easy to apply but lead to
deviations from normative predictions. These biases are often systematic, making humans not
just boundedly rational but predictably irrational (Ariely 2010). These systematic deviations
allow us to design mechanisms based on behavioral models with the goal of engineering better
decision making.
To design effective mechanisms it is important to understand the psychological underpinnings
that contribute to biases. In behavioral science, the ancient idea that cognitive processes
can be partitioned into two main families has become standard under the so-called “dual
process theory of mind” (Epstein 1994, Sloman 1996). There is a rich body of literature on
how cognitive processes can be defined (see Stanovich and West 2000 and Evans 2008 for an
overview), with the common notion that one process is more intuitive while the other process
5
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Table 1.1 Two Cognitive Systems
System 1 System 2
Intuitive Reflective
Fast Slow
Automatic Controlled
Effortless Effortful
Associative Deductive
Unconscious Self-aware
Skilled Rule-following
is more reflective. Stanovich and West (2000) and Kahneman and Frederick (2002) refer to
these two cognitive processes as System 1 and System 2. Characteristics commonly attributed
to the two systems are listed in Table 1.1. The operations of System 1 are intuitive, fast,
automatic, and effortless. System 2 refers to operations, which are reflective, slow, controlled,
and effortful. If an individual faces a judgment problem, System 1 quickly proposes an
intuitive answer to the problem and System 2 can endorse or override this proposal. Although
System 1 often proposes correct answers, these fast and effortless answers come with a cost:
systematic biases (Arkes 1991).
The existence of systematic biases started an on-going debate about the most effective
strategies for debiasing individual biases (Larrick 2004, Soll et al. 2015). Klayman and
Brown (1993) suggest to group debiasing techniques into two general approaches: “modify
the decision maker” or “modify the environment”. The first approach assumes that the
environment is more or less fixed, and, therefore, the best debiasing approach is to provide
decision makers with a combination of education, training, and tools to help overcome their
cognitive limitations (Soll et al. 2015). These approaches have already been tested successfully
in field of behavioral operations. For example, Bolton et al. (2012) use task training to improve
performance in newsvendor decisions and Ren and Croson (2013) provide their subjects with
a tool for reducing overprecision and thereby improve subjects’ ordering behavior. The second
approach to debiasing is to modify the environment in which a decision is made in ways that
reduce the likelihood of biases (Soll et al. 2015). This approach comprises incentives and
choice architecture tools (Johnson et al. 2012) designed to “nudge” decision makers toward
better decisions (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, Johnson et al. 2012, Soll et al. 2015), and is part
6
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of behavioral economic engineering.
Behavioral economic engineering applied to operations management can help firms to design
mechanisms to improve the performance of their processes, given a better understanding of
behavioral regularities. First efforts aim to engineer better order decisions (Bolton and Katok
2008, Lee and Siemsen 2016), procurement auctions (Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. 2007, Davis
et al. 2014), supply contracts (Becker-Peth et al. 2013, Becker-Peth and Thonemann 2016) or
incentive schemes (de Vries et al. 2016, Scheele et al. 2017). The aim of this dissertation is
to join these efforts and improve decision making in operations through applying behavioral
economic engineering.
1.3 Outline
This section outlines the structure of this dissertation. Although sharing the overall common
goal of improving decisions through behavioral economic engineering, the three main chapters
of this dissertation represent independent research projects. Each chapter considers an
example of how decision making can be improved through behavioral economic engineering
and is written in a way that the reader should be able to understand it without having read
all of the prior parts of the dissertation in detail. At the end of each chapter we provide
supplemental material for each project (for example, experimental instructions, screen shots
of the experimental implementations, post-experimental questionnaires, etc.).
Beyond the goal of improving decisions all research projects focus on individual decision
making in an operations context investigated through a common lens: controlled experiments.
We conducted 58 experimental sessions at the Cologne Laboratory of Economic Research
(CLER) at the University of Cologne, six sessions at the Laboratory for Behavioral Operations
and Economics (LBOE) at the University of Texas at Dallas, and one experimental study on
Amazon Mechanical Turk, a crowd-sourcing marketplace run by Amazon.com, Inc. (Paolacci
et al. 2010, Buhrmester et al. 2011). In addition, we collected data at three business conferences
(Marcus Evans 2013, Supply Chain Academy 2013, Copperberg 2013). In total we report
data from 785 subjects. In the following we give a brief overview of each chapter:
7
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Chapter 2 analyzes how performance metrics that contain equivalent information affect
human decisions.4 We consider two such performance metrics from supply chain management,
days of supply and inventory turn rate, where one is the inverse of the other. We argue that
individuals’ evaluation of performance is affected by the metric as opposed to solely based on
the fundamental attribute. We conducted three laboratory studies in which we investigate
decision making in inventory management. The first study considers alternative inventory
optimizations, out of which one must be selected. The second study analyzes a decision
maker who must decide on the effort to invest in optimizing inventory of a specific product.
The third study corresponds to the economic order quantity model. Our behavioral models
suggest that decisions are affected by the metric that is used to indicate performance and we
find support for the predictions in our laboratory experiments.
Chapter 3 analyzes human decision making under service level contracts.5 Service level
contracts can be parameterized, such that they have steep expected profit functions around
the expected profit-maximizing order quantity – an interesting property that other supply
contracts do not offer. We argue that this property leads to improved decision making. We
provide analytical models and perform a laboratory experiment to analyze ordering behavior
under service level contracts and compare the performance with that under wholesale price
contracts, which have flat expected profit functions. In our experiment, the efficiency that
human subjects achieved under a service level contract was 97.2%, compared with an efficiency
of 88.1% under a wholesale price contract.
Chapter 4 examines compliance rates (trust) for forecast guidance in a simple take-
the-risk or take-the-cost decision game.6 We analyze two ways of conveying the risk in
forecasts to non-expert users: providing the probability of the uncertain event or providing an
explicit advice. It turns out that low numerate subjects exhibit less trust in recommendation
4This chapter is based on the paper by Stangl and Thonemann (2017) and benefited from comments of two
anonymous referees and the editors of Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, seminar participants
at the University of Cologne and the University of Texas at Dallas, and participants at the 2013 INFORMS
Annual Meeting and the 9th Annual Behavioral Operations Conference.
5This chapter is based on the paper by Bolton et al. (2017) and benefited from seminar participants at the
University of Cologne and the University of Texas at Dallas, and participants at the 2014 INFORMS Annual
Meeting, the POMS 26th Annual Conference, and the 2016 INFORMS Annual Meeting.
6This chapter is joint work with Gary E. Bolton and Elena Katok and benefited from seminar participants at
the University of Cologne, UC Riverside, and the Erasmus University Rotterdam and participants at the 12th
Annual Behavioral Operations Conference.
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forecasts than high numerate subjects. While we find a positive relationship between subjects’
numeracy and trust in probability forecasts, this relationship is overshadowed by the fact
that even high numerate subjects use the probabilities inefficiently. Forecast guidance that
blends probabilities and recommendations, in a way designed to offset the major behavioral
shortcomings we observe, can improve compliance.
Chapter 5 summarizes the key results, offers concluding remarks on the contribution of
this dissertation and provides a general outlook to future research in the field of behavioral
operations.
1.4 Contribution
This dissertation adds to the emerging field of behavioral operations. The contributions of
each research project are described in detail at the beginning of the respective chapter. The
overall contribution to the field is mainly twofold:
Identifying behavioral regularities: We analyze behavioral regularities in an operations
context. In our three research projects we compare different performance metrics, supply
contracts, or forms of forecast guidance, respectively. Within each experimental study, the
treatments share the same normative solution. Thus, fully rational decision makers should
be unaffected by which of the metrics, supply contracts, or forms of forecast guidance is
used. This common design feature allows us to analyze how human decision makers react to
different mechanisms and to identify behavioral regularities.
Engineering better decision making: Based on the behavioral regularities that we identify in
our experimental studies we propose and test mechanisms to improve performance of human
decision making. We demonstrate that the design of performance metrics, supply contracts,
or forecast guidance can significantly improve decisions. We also study the interaction of
individual differences (for example, numeracy) with the proposed mechanism. This allows us
to make recommendations of how to tailor the design to different groups of individuals.
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Equivalent Inventory Metrics:
A Behavioral Perspective
We analyze how performance metrics that contain equivalent information affect actual decisions.
We consider two such performance metrics from supply chain management, days of supply
and inventory turn rate, where one is the inverse of the other. We argue that individuals’
assessment of performance is also affected by the metric as opposed to solely based on the
inventory value that actually matters. We perform three laboratory studies and analyze
how decisions are affected by the metric used to indicate inventory performance. The first
study considers alternative inventory optimizations, out of which one must be selected. The
second study analyzes a decision maker who must decide on the effort to invest in optimizing
inventory of a specific product. The third study corresponds to the economic order quantity
model. Our behavioral models suggest that decisions are affected by the metric that is used
to indicate performance and we find support for the predictions in laboratory experiments
with human subjects: Under the inventory turn rate metric, individuals over-value inventory
reductions. Compared to decisions under the days of supply metric, they choose worse inventory
optimization options, invest more effort optimizing inventory of specific products, and choose
higher ordering cost.
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2.1 Introduction
Performance metrics are used to quantitatively assess the performance of organizations,
functions, projects, and individuals. Important decisions are based on performance metrics,
such as investment selections, budget allocations, and employee rewards. There exists a
rich body of literature that provides guidance for choosing appropriate metrics (Parmenter
2010, Eckerson 2011). However, multiple metrics that contain the same information are
often available, and it is unclear which one should be preferred. We refer to such metrics as
equivalent metrics. Fully rational decision makers are unaffected by which of the equivalent
metrics is used, but the decisions of actual human decision makers can be affected.
We consider equivalent metrics, where one metric is the inverse of the other. Such metrics
are widely used in management. The overall performance of a company can be measured by
the earnings yield and its inverse, the price-to-earnings ratio; a project can be evaluated by
the payback period and its inverse, the return on investment; sales efficiency can be measured
by cost per acquisition and its inverse, the acquisitions per dollar spent; employee retention
can be evaluated by the employee turnover rate and its inverse, the employee retention time;
and the number of calls in call centers can be measured by the incoming call rate and its
inverse, the inter-arrival time.
In supply chain management, performance metrics and their inverses are used in many
areas (Table 2.1). Our focus is on inventory management, which is one of the central areas of
supply chain management. Inventory is part of a company’s working capital and an important
driver of financial performance. In inventory management, the equivalent performance metrics
days of supply and inventory turn rate are commonly used (Caplice and Sheffi 1994, Hausman
2004). Days of supply measures the average duration that products are held in inventory
Table 2.1 Examples of Equivalent Metrics Used in Supply Chain Management
Area Time based Rate based
Inventory Days of supply (90 days) Inventory turn rate (4/year)
Warehousing Picking time (30 sec/unit) Picking rate (120 units/hr)
Production Production time (1 min/unit) Production rate (60 units/hr)
Reliability Mean time between failures (10 years) Failure rate (10%/year)
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and is usually specified in terms of days. Its inverse, the inventory turn rate, measures the
frequency at which the inventory stock is replenished or turned over, and is usually specified
as an annual rate. An inventory system with 90 days of supply, for instance, has an inventory
turn rate of 4 per year.
Days of supply and inventory turn rate are both popular in practice. In recent surveys
that we conducted at three supply chain management conferences (Copperberg 2013, Marcus
Evans 2013, Supply Chain Academy 2013), we asked 51 managers of manufacturing companies
about the performance metrics used at their companies: 31% of the participants reported that
they use days of supply, but not inventory turn rate, 31% that they use inventory turn rate,
but not days of supply, and 28% that they use both metrics, while 10% used other metrics
or did not provide answers. Similar results were reported by Harrison and New (2002) and
Cohen et al. (2007). In informal interviews, we could not identify a consistent pattern in the
rationales for choosing one metric versus the other.1
We are not the first to analyze the effect of equivalent metrics on decision making. Larrick
and Soll (2008) analyzed how fuel efficiency metrics affect people’s evaluations of fuel consump-
tion. They conducted an experiment in which subjects had to reduce the fuel consumption
of a car fleet. Subjects could increase the fuel efficiency of a fleet from 15 to 19 miles per
gallon or, alternatively, of another car fleet from 34 to 44 miles per gallon. Only 25% of the
participants chose the first, correct, option, that reduced fuel consumption more than twice
as much as the second option. In another treatment, in which fuel efficiency was expressed in
terms of the equivalent metric of gallons per 100 miles, 64% of the subjects chose the correct
option. Although fuel consumption optimization and inventory optimization are decision
problems from different fields, the problem structures are very similar. The setup of our first
experiment is very closely related to the miles per gallon illusion experiments of Larrick and
Soll (2008), and as we will show, we find similar decision biases.
The effect of metrics on decision making can be explained by attribute substitution: When
1To obtain insights into when these metrics are used, we consulted Knut Alicke, Master Expert of Supply Chain
Management at McKinsey&Company (personal communication, May 13, 2016). Alicke has worked as a supply chain
consultant with over 50 companies from various industries. He confirmed the initial insight from our surveys that there
is no consistent pattern in the usage of the two metrics. While some of the companies he worked with use inventory turn
rate, others use days of supply, and some use both. Alicke reported that in companies that use both metrics, inventory
turn rate tends to be used frequently for financial reporting. Overall, he could not identify a clear relationship between
hierarchical level or functional area and the use of the metrics that is consistent across companies.
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confronted with a difficult question, people instead answer an easier question and are often
actually unaware of the substitution (Kahneman and Frederick 2002), particularly if the
relationships involved are non-linear (Sterman 2002). Individuals do not necessarily make
decisions that optimize the fundamental attribute; instead, they optimize media that are
more readily available (Hsee et al. 2003). We use attribute substitution to model the effect of
metrics on inventory valuations. We show that decision makers tend to optimize the values of
the metric that is used to measure inventory performance, as opposed to the fundamental
attribute that is actually relevant, the inventory value. The relationship between the days of
supply metric and the inventory value is linear, and decision makers who substitute inventory
value by days of supply correctly value inventory changes. The relationship between the
inventory turn rate metric and the inventory value is convex, and decision makers who
substitute inventory value by the inventory turn rate over-value inventory changes.
We use a deductive approach for analyzing the effect of inventory metrics on decision
making. We perform three laboratory studies that are based on different problem types,
namely choice, effort, and cost optimization problems. Many inventory optimization problems
are of these types, and we analyze one in each of our three studies.
In Study 1, we adapt Larrick and Soll’s (2008) miles per gallon experiment to analyze an
operations management context. We consider a choice problem, in which a decision maker
must select an inventory optimization option from a set of options. Inventory managers face
this type of decision when they decide on the business units, locations, or processes to optimize
or when they prioritize such optimizations. We hypothesize that people more frequently
decide optimally under the days of supply metric, which is proportional to inventory value,
than under the inventory turn rate metric, which is convex in inventory value (Hypothesis 2.1).
The results of our experiments support the hypothesis. In our main experiment, 89.3% of
the choices are optimal under the days of supply metric, compared with 42.4% under the
inventory turn rate metric.
Our behavioral models build on attribute substitution. Applied to our setting, attribute
substitution suggests that decisions are affected by the value of the metric and not only by
the inventory value, which would be optimal. We argue that the extent to which people rely
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on the value of the metric depends on their cognitive reflection, which we quantify by the
cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick 2005) score. We hypothesize that people with high
CRT scores rely less on the metric and make better decisions than people with low CRT
scores (Hypothesis 2.2). We analyze the CRT scores of the subjects of our main experiment
and find support for the hypothesis. Subjects with high CRT scores solve up to 31.1% more
problems optimally than those with low CRT scores.
In Study 2, we consider an effort problem, in which a decision maker determines the
effort to invest in reducing inventory of a product. Similar problems occur, for instance, in
lean manufacturing environments when employees are working on continuous optimization.
Because the inventory turn rate is convex increasing in inventory reduction, it indicates a
greater than actual effect of effort on inventory reductions, and we hypothesize that individuals
invest more effort under the inventory turn rate metric than under the days of supply metric
(Hypothesis 2.3). In our laboratory experiment, we find support for the hypothesis. Individuals
invest on average 28.0% more effort under the inventory turn rate metric than under the days
of supply metric.
In Study 3, we consider a cost optimization problem, in which a decision maker must
determine the resources to allocate to ordering. Allocating resources to ordering is costly, but
reduces inventory. The problem is closely related to the economic order quantity model, one
of the standard models in inventory management. We hypothesize that individuals allocate
more resources to ordering under the inventory turn rate than under the days of supply metric
(Hypothesis 2.4), and our experimental results support the hypothesis. Subjects choose on
average a 69.5% higher ordering cost under the inventory turn rate metric than under the
days of supply metric.
In all of our studies, decisions are affected by the inventory metrics, and it seems reasonable
to expect that decisions are also affected by the metrics in other inventory settings. Given
the significances and magnitudes of the effects that we observe, our research suggests that
management should pay close attention to choosing the right metric. In many instances,
the days of supply metric will probably be the preferred choice because it is proportional
to inventory value. However, there might exist situations in which the inventory turn rate
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metric could be the preferred choice. Its convexity in inventory reduction could be utilized,
for instance, to motivate people to reduce inventory in situations in which the inventory level
is already low.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the relevant literature. Section 2.3
presents our behavioral valuation model on which we base our hypotheses. Sections 2.4 through
2.6 contain our experimental studies. Section 2.7 concludes and discusses the managerial
implications of our findings.
2.2 Related Literature
Two streams of literature are related to our research: the literature on proxy attributes
and the presentation of information and the literature on dual process theory and cognitive
reflection. We will review both streams below.
Proxy Attributes and the Presentation of Information. A metric such as days of supply or
inventory turn rate can be considered a proxy attribute – an indirect and often more available
measure of a more fundamental attribute, in our case inventory value (Keeney and Raiffa 1976).
Proxy attributes are widely used in intuitive judgment and in many quantitative analyses in
operations management. Kahneman and Frederick (2002) referred to the tendency to focus
on a proxy attribute rather than assessing the fundamental attribute as attribute substitution.
They revisited the earlier studies on heuristic judgment (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1983,
Kahneman et al. 1982) and proposed a model of judgment heuristics in which the reduction
of complex tasks to simpler operations is achieved by attribute substitution. Consistent with
our findings, Fischer et al. (1987) found that decision makers who were presented with a
proxy attribute did not necessarily translate it into the fundamental attribute and gave the
proxy attribute more weight than they should have.
Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Kahneman and Frederick (2002) argued that the use of proxy
attributes can lead to systematic biases, if the computation of the fundamental attribute
places a cognitive burden on the cognitive processes of decision makers. Managers often
need to make quick decisions and intuitively consider the relationship between the proxy
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and the fundamental attribute. Especially if the relationship is complex or probabilistic,
they tend to rely on simplifying heuristics (Fischer et al. 1987). One of the major sources of
complexity is non-linearity (Sterman 2002). Prior research has identified various situations
in which people reason poorly if the relationship between the proxy and the fundamental
attribute is non-linear. Perhaps the most noted misperception in this domain is the MPG
illusion (Larrick and Soll 2008), whereby people rely on miles per gallon as a linear indicator
of fuel efficiency. Larrick and Soll (2008) analyzed how people value fuel consumption. In
a treatment in which they indicated fuel efficiency by the miles per gallon metric, people
tended to over-value efficiency improvements of cars that are already efficient. In another
treatment, in which fuel efficiency was expressed in terms of the equivalent metric gallons
per 100 miles, which is linear in fuel efficiency, people were nudged toward better decisions
(Thaler and Sunstein 2008, Johnson et al. 2012).
Svenson (1970, 2008) analyzed how people estimate time savings from increased driving
speeds. He found that typical estimates are based on the differences in driving speeds instead
of the actual time savings. Hsee et al. (2003) conducted an experiment in which they compared
the effort of participants who were offered rewards that directly related to effort with that of
participants who first received points that were later converted into rewards. Although the
relationship between effort and reward was the same in all treatments, effort levels differed
and depended on the number of points received. Another study showing the insensitivity to
fundamental attributes is by Kagel et al. (1996), who analyzed how decisions are affected
by proxy attributes. They conducted an experiment in which participants bargained over
chips with different exchange rates. They found that participants’ perceptions of fairness were
more focused on the number of the chips than on the value of the chips. In another study,
Soll et al. (2013) found that people expect that monthly credit payments have a roughly
linear relationship with the payback period and therefore underestimate the payback period
when monthly payments barely cover interest. In general, people often reason poorly about
accumulation problems (see Cronin et al. 2009 and the references therein).
Even absent non-linearities, the presentation of seemingly equivalent information can affect
decision making. Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) conducted a study in which participants had
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the chance to win a prize by drawing a red jelly bean from an urn. Their participants often
preferred to draw from an urn containing a greater absolute number but a smaller proportion
of red beans (for example, 7 in 100) than from an urn with fewer red beans but a better chance
to win (for example, 1 in 10). In a series of studies, Slovic et al. (2000) analyzed the different
reactions to risk presented as probability and risk presented as frequency. Experienced forensic
psychologists and psychiatrists were asked to rate the likelihood that a patient would commit
an act of violence. Clinicians who were given another expert’s assessment of a patient’s risk
of violence framed in terms of relative frequency rated patients as more dangerous than those
who were shown the “equivalent” risk assessment expressed as a probability. Similar results
were obtained by Yamagishi (1997), whose participants perceived a disease that kills 1,286
people out of every 10,000 to be more dangerous than one that kills 24.14% of the population.
We build on the research on proxy attributes (Keeney and Raiffa 1976, Fischer et al. 1987)
and attribute substitution (Kahneman and Frederick 2002) to model the effect of inventory
metrics on inventory valuations. Consistent with medium maximization (Hsee et al. 2003), we
show that individuals are affected by the value of the metrics and do not rely exclusively on
the values of the fundamental attribute, such that metrics that contain the same information,
but are framed differently, result in different decisions. The design of our Study 1 is similar to
that used by Larrick and Soll (2008), and Study 2 is related to the experimental design of Hsee
et al. (2003). Study 3 is not directly related to previous work in behavioral decision making
but considers a setting that is closely related to one of the standard models of inventory
management, that is, the economic order quantity model (Harris 1990, Erlenkotter 1990).
The results of our experiments are in line with the decision biases discussed above. Under
the inventory turn rate metric, individuals over-value inventory reductions and, compared
with decisions under the days of supply metric, they choose worse inventory optimization
options, invest more effort optimizing inventory of specific products, and choose a higher
ordering cost.
The literature has shown that people are not equally prone to such decision biases and that
cognitive reflection can explain some of the variation in decision outcomes. Therefore, we
next review the literature on dual process theory and cognitive reflection.
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Dual Process Theory and Cognitive Reflection. In dual process theory, cognitive processes
are partitioned into two qualitatively different but inter-operating types of thinking style
systems (Epstein 1994, Sloman 1996). There is a rich body of literature on how cognitive
processes can be defined (see Stanovich and West (2000) and Evans (2008) for an overview),
with the common notion that one process is more intuitive and the other process more rational
than the other. Stanovich and West (2000) and Kahneman and Frederick (2002) refer to the
cognitive processes as System 1 and System 2. System 1 is intuitive, fast, automatic, and
effortless, while System 2 is reflective, slow, rational, and effortful. If an individual faces a
problem, System 1 generates suggestions for System 2. System 2 can endorse or override
these suggestions.
Frederick (2005) proposes the CRT to measure the extent to which a person uses System 2.
The CRT consists of three questions, such as “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat
costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?”. The intuitive answers are
wrong – in the example, the intuitive answer is $0.10, but the correct answer is $0.05. The
extent to which individuals choose the non-intuitive answers is measured by the CRT score,
which corresponds to the number of correct answers on the test. The CRT score indicates
how likely an individual is to reflect on an answer, that is, to use System 2 to override an
incorrect intuitive System 1 suggestion as opposed to endorsing it. The objective nature of
the CRT makes it an attractive candidate for understanding decision biases in our experiment
(Oechssler et al. 2009, Toplak et al. 2011). It is brief, easy to administer, unambiguous, and
widely used in laboratory experiments. Moreover, it has been proven to be a reliable predictor
for task performance in the behavioral operations management literature. Individuals with
high cognitive reflection have higher forecasting performance (Moritz et al. 2014) and perform
better in newsvendor-type decisions (Moritz et al. 2013), and this effect is robust to controlling
for intelligence. Narayanan and Moritz (2015) showed that cognitive reflection also provides
a powerful predictor for the bull-whip effect and supply chain performance in a multi-echelon
setting.
We build on previous research on proxy attributes to analyze the tendency of decision
makers to rely on inventory metrics as a proxy for the more fundamental attribute, inventory
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value. Prior research has analyzed the effect of cognitive reflection on decision making and
shown that individuals with high cognitive reflection are less prone to decision biases than
those with low cognitive reflection (Oechssler et al. 2009, Toplak et al. 2011). Moritz et al.
(2013) were the first to analyze cognitive reflection in an inventory management context. Like
us, they use the CRT score (Frederick 2005) as a proxy for cognitive reflection. In addition,
we use decision time and calculator use as proxies for cognitive reflection. We find that
individuals with high cognitive reflection make on average better decisions and than those
with low cognitive reflection. Moreover, we show that the performance metric can moderate
the effect that cognitive reflection has on task performance.
2.3 Behavioral Valuation Model
We are interested in understanding how inventory decisions are affected by the metrics
that are used to indicate inventory performance. The fundamental measure of inventory
performance is the inventory value. It quantifies the capital that is tied up in inventory, and
profit-maximizing (“rational”) individuals rely on it in their decision making. If the metrics
days of supply or inventory turn rate are used to indicate inventory performance, rational
individuals determine the corresponding inventory values and base their decisions on them.
Cognitive science research indicates that not all decision makers use this approach and that
some base their decisions on the metrics.
2.3.1 Inventory Performance Metrics
The value of the capital that is tied up in inventory, the inventory value, is the fundamental
measure of inventory performance. For a product with unit cost c and inventory level I, the
inventory value is
M = cI. (2.1)
To evaluate the efficiency of inventory usage over time or to compare inventory across
companies, locations, or products, the performance metrics days of supply and inventory turn
rate are commonly used (Hausman 2004). The days of supply metric relates the inventory
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value to the cost of goods sold. For a demand rate of d, the cost of goods sold is cd and the
days of supply metric is defined as
T = M
cd
= I
d
, (2.2)
where we use the variable T to indicate that it is a time-based measure. The days of supply
metric measures the average duration that products are held in inventory, and a lower value
indicates higher performance.
The inventory turn rate metric relates the cost of goods sold to the inventory value and is
defined as
R = c d
M
= d
I
, (2.3)
where we use the variable R to indicate that it is a rate-based measure. The inventory turn
rate metric measures the frequency at which the inventory stock is replenished, and a higher
value indicates higher performance. Because the days of supply metric is the inverse of the
inventory turn rate metric, the two metrics are equivalent and a rational individual makes
the same decisions under either metric.
2.3.2 Valuation of Inventory Reductions by Metrics
One of the key tasks of supply chain managers is to identify and implement improvements
that reduce inventory. Inventory reduction can be achieved, for instance, by reducing supply
lead times, automating order processing, or improving demand forecasting accuracy (see, for
example, Cachon and Terwiesch 2013). Such activities require effort or financial investments,
and to determine which of them to pursue, the value of the inventory reductions that they
achieve must be determined. We denote the initial inventory level by I0 and the inventory
level after the reduction by I1. An inventory level reduction of I0 − I1 reduces the inventory
value by VM = c(I0 − I1).
Because days of supply is the reciprocal of the inventory turn rate (T = 1/R), the metrics
are equivalent and rational individuals make the same decisions under either metric. However,
if inventory performance is measured by the days of supply or inventory turn rate metric,
we expect that some individuals will not invest the cognitive effort required to compute the
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inventory value and will instead value inventory based on the metric. We next analyze how
such individuals value inventory reductions.
Days of Supply. If an individual uses the days of supply metric as a proxy and substitute
for inventory value, then the value assigned to a reduction in the days of supply metric from
T0 = I0/d to T1 = I1/d is
VT = t(T0 − T1), (2.4)
where the parameter t is the value that an individual associates with a unit decrease in the
days of supply metric. Following Larrick and Soll (2008), we use linear relationships between
the proxy measure and the valuation. To express VT as a function of the inventory levels, we
replace T0 with I0/d and T1 with I1/d and obtain
VT = t
d
(I0 − I1), (2.5)
which is the value that an individual relying on Equation (2.4) assigns to an inventory level
reduction from I0 to I1.
Inventory Turn Rate. If an individual uses the inventory turn rate metric as a proxy and
substitute for inventory value, then the value assigned to an increase in the inventory turn
rate metric from R0 = d/I0 to R1 = d/I1 is
VR = r(R1 −R0), (2.6)
where the parameter r is the value associated with a unit increase in the inventory turn rate
metric and we again use a linear relationship between the proxy measure and the valuation.
To express VR as a function of the inventory levels, we replace R0 with d/I0 and R1 with
d/I1 and obtain
VR = rd( 1
I1
− 1
I0
) , (2.7)
which is the value that an individual relying on Equation (2.6) assigns to an inventory level
reduction from I0 to I1. The function is strictly convex increasing in the inventory reduction,
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Figure 2.1 Valuation of Inventory Reductions by Days of Supply and Inventory Turn Rate
(c = 1, d = 10,000, I0 = 5,000)
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whereas the optimal valuation is linear increasing in it. Therefore, there does not exist a
constant value for r for which the valuation is correct over a range of inventory reductions.
To optimally evaluate inventory reductions, a decision maker must use the function r =
cI0I1/d. Rational decision makers use this function, but those who rely on the substitution
heuristic and postulate a linear relationship between the inventory turn rate metric and the
valuation use a value of r that is independent of the inventory reduction.
Figure 2.1 provides an example to illustrate how inventory changes are valued by subjects
relying on the metrics. The left graph shows the valuation under the days of supply metric.
The gray line indicates the optimal valuation (VM ), which is the same valuation as that
under the days of supply metric with an optimal parameter value for t = cd (VT (t=10,000)). If
changes in days of supply are over-valued (t = 15, 000) or under-valued (t = 5, 000), the days of
supply valuation differs from the optimal valuation, but both depend linearly on the inventory
reduction. This implies, for instance, that the value assigned to an inventory reduction is
independent of the initial inventory level, which is optimal.
The right graph shows the valuation under the inventory turn rate metric. The valuation
is convex increasing in the inventory reduction, which implies that for any fixed value of r,
the value assigned to a given inventory reduction depends on the initial inventory level. This
implies that sufficiently large inventory reductions, that is, inventory reductions that are
greater than those where VM and VR intersect, are over-valued.
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2.4 Study 1: Effect of Performance Metrics on Investment
Decisions
A common management task is selecting investments from a set of investment options
with different returns. Managers must decide, for instance, which of several business units,
locations, or processes to optimize. We consider such a problem, in which a decision maker
must determine which of multiple inventory optimization options to choose. The effect of the
optimization options is indicated by the days of supply or inventory turn rate metric.
2.4.1 Behavioral Investment Models
Consider two alternative inventory optimization options for two products A and B. The initial
inventory level of product A is IA0 , and an investment in inventory optimization reduces
it to IA1 . The initial inventory level of product B is IB0 , and an investment in inventory
optimization reduces it to IB1 . To keep the model parsimonious, we consider products with
the same unit costs, demand rates, and investment costs but with different initial inventory
levels and different inventory reductions.
A rational decision maker values the optimization options based on their effect on the
inventory value and chooses Option A if
V AM = c(IA0 − IA1 ) > c(IB0 − IB1 ) = V BM (2.8)
and Option B otherwise.
If the optimization options are valued by the days of supply metric, Option A is chosen if
V AT = td(IA0 − IA1 ) > td(IB0 − IB1 ) = V BT (2.9)
and Option B is chosen otherwise. The only difference between the valuations by Equations
(2.8) and (2.9) is that the inventory reductions in Equation (2.9) are scaled by a factor t/d.
Because the factor is the same for both options, the decisions are the same under both
valuations and optimal choices are made under the days of supply metric.
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Figure 2.2 Effect of Initial Inventory and Inventory Reduction on Valuation under Inventory Turn Rate
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If the optimization options are valued by the inventory turn rate metric, Option A is chosen
if
V AR = rd( 1IA1 − 1IA0 ) > rd( 1IB1 − 1IB0 ) = V BR (2.10)
or, equivalently, if (IA0 − IA1 )IB0 IB1 > (IB0 − IB1 )IA0 IA1 . (2.11)
Otherwise, Option B is chosen.
The choices under the inventory turn rate metric are not always optimal because the
inventory turn rate over-values inventory reductions if the initial inventory is small or the
inventory reduction is large. The left graph in Figure 2.2 depicts an example with initial
inventory levels IA0 = 100 and IB0 = 25. The gray area indicates where decision makers who
rely on the inventory turn rate metric make the wrong decisions.
Thus far, we have discussed how people decide if they rely exclusively on one of the metrics
or on the inventory value. Hsee et al. (2003) demonstrated that individuals do not necessarily
rely exclusively on the proxy or the fundamental attribute but that their valuations are
affected by the values of the proxy and the fundamental attribute, if both values are available.
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Translated to our setting, this finding suggests that individuals who compute the inventory
value based on the metric do not necessarily rely exclusively on the inventory value but also
on the value of the metric.
Such behavior can be modeled using a weighted average of the value of the metric and
the inventory value. We denote the weight that a decision maker places on the metric by w(0 ≤ w ≤ 1) and the weight he or she places on the inventory value by (1 −w). The extreme
cases of w = 0 and w = 1 correspond to decision makers who rely on inventory value or the
value of the metric only, respectively. Values of w strictly above zero and strictly below one
model the combined approach suggested by Hsee et al. (2003). It can be shown that for all
strictly positive weights w, some decisions are incorrect under the inventory turn rate metric.
The right graph in Figure 2.2 shows an example for w = 0.5. The gray area is decreasing in w,
but it always exists for weights w > 0, such that some decisions are not made optimally under
the inventory turn rate metric. Under the days of supply metric, individuals are not prone to
such decision biases, and we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2.1. Optimal investment decisions are made more frequently under the days of
supply metric than under the inventory turn rate metric.
2.4.2 Effect of Individual Thinking Styles on Decisions
To gain a better understanding of the drivers behind the potential heterogeneity of the
decisions, we draw from the theory of cognitive science. We use dual process theory, which
has already been successfully applied to understand heterogeneity in forecasting and decision
making in the newsvendor problem (Moritz et al. 2013, 2014).
We follow Stanovich and West (2000) and Kahneman and Frederick (2002) and refer to the
cognitive processes as System 1 and System 2. System 1 is intuitive, fast, automatic, and
effortless, while System 2 is reflective, slow, rational, and effortful (see Section 2.2 for details).
If an individual faces a problem, System 1 generates suggestions for System 2. System 2 can
endorse or override these suggestions. In our problem, the option that increases the metric
the most can be considered the intuitive suggestion because the metric is the proxy attribute
that is directly available to the decision maker. If System 2 endorses the suggestion in the
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inventory turn rate treatment, the wrong decision can be made. If System 2 is alerted and
overrides an incorrect intuitive suggestion, it becomes more likely that the optimal decision is
made.
Frederick (2005) proposes the CRT to measure the extent to which an individual uses
System 2. The higher an individual’s tendency to override an incorrect intuitive response
of System 1, the higher the probability that the problem is solved optimally. Individuals
with high CRT scores do not only override System 1 more frequently than individuals with
low CRT scores, but they are also generally more likely to make optimal choices. Frederick
(2005) and Toplak et al. (2011) found that the CRT overlaps with intelligence and cognitive
ability. Therefore, we expect that individuals with high CRT scores make better decisions
than individuals with low CRT scores under both metrics but that the effect is stronger under
the inventory turn rate metric, where the suggestion of System 1 must be overridden, which
leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.2.
(a) Under the days of supply metric, individuals with high CRT scores make optimal
investment decisions more frequently than individuals with low CRT scores.
(b) Under the inventory turn rate metric, individuals with high CRT scores make optimal
investment decisions more frequently than individuals with low CRT scores.
(c) The effect of the CRT score on the frequency of optimal choices is stronger under the
inventory turn rate metric than under the days of supply metric.
2.4.3 Investment Experiment
We conducted a laboratory experiment in which human subjects had to decide between two
inventory optimization options, where one option reduced inventory more than the other.
In the experiment, we used two treatments, a days of supply treatment and an inventory
turn rate treatment, that differed only in how the performance of the inventory system was
measured.
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Table 2.2 Treatments of Investment Experiment
Days of supply Inventory turns rate
Option A Option B Option A Option B
Problem Initial Optimized Initial Optimized Initial Optimized Initial Optimized
1 60 30 20 10 6 12 18 36
2 24 15 8 5 15 24 45 72
3 120 72 60 36 3 5 6 10
All sessions followed the same protocol. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were
randomly assigned to one of the two treatments and received the corresponding instructions
(Supplementary Material 2.A). The written instructions explained how the performance
metrics are computed and provided an example. Subjects were informed that they had to
manage a warehouse with two products with the same unit costs and annual demand rates
of 10,000 units but with different initial days of supply or inventory turn rates. Subjects
were informed that they could optimize the inventory of one of the products and that they
would receive a payment of 10 experimental currency units (ECUs) for each unit of inventory
reduction. They were also informed that the exchange rate would be 1 euro per 3,000 ECUs.
After reading the instructions, subjects could ask questions that the instructor answered
privately.
During the experiment, subjects made the three investment decisions shown in Table 2.2.
The problems were designed to achieve variation in the absolute values of the optimal inventory
reduction and in the difference in the inventory reduction achieved under the two options.
The problems were presented sequentially, and the sequence was randomized. Participants
could make decisions at their own pace and were informed that the experiment was not time
restricted.
After they had made their investment decisions, subjects took the CRT, stated whether they
already knew the questions, and completed a post-experimental questionnaire, in which we
asked questions regarding participants’ attitudes and preferences, as well as general questions
about the experiment. We also collected demographic data.
A total of 114 students from the faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences of
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Figure 2.3 Results of Investment Decision Experiment
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the University of Cologne were recruited via the Online Recruitment System for Economic
Experiments (ORSEE, Greiner 2004). The experiment was conduced in six sessions. In total,
59 subjects were assigned to the days of supply treatment and 55 subjects to the inventory
turn rate treatment. The sessions lasted 45 minutes on average and were programmed and
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The average payment was 9.29 euros,
including a participation fee of 2.50 euros.
2.4.4 Results
The fractions of optimal choices are shown in the left graphs in Figure 2.3. Averaged over all
problems, 89.3% of the decisions were optimal in the days of supply treatment and 42.4%
were optimal in the inventory turn rate treatment. The difference in the aggregate fraction
is significant (Wilcoxon test, one sided, p < 0.001), as are the differences in the fractions
for the individual problems (χ2 (1, N = 114), p < 0.001 for all problems). We conclude that
optimal investment decisions are made more frequently under the days of supply than under
the inventory turn rate metric, which provides support for Hypothesis 2.1.
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Figure 2.4 Effect of CRT Score on the Fraction of Optimal Choices
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The right graphs in Figure 2.3 depict the inventory reductions that were achieved under
both metrics. The inventory reductions are related to the optimal choices but are also affected
by the magnitudes of the inventory reductions stipulated in the problems. In the days of
supply treatment, the average total inventory reduction was 2,269 units and significantly
greater than the reduction of 1,595 units in the inventory turn rate treatment (Wilcoxon test,
one-sided, p < 0.001).
We next analyze the effect of the CRT scores on decision making. Of the 114 subjects, 49
stated that they already knew the CRT questions before the experiment, and we exclude
them from the analyses. Following Oechssler et al. (2009) and Hoppe and Kusterer (2011),
we pool the CRT scores of the remaining 65 subjects into a low CRT score group (CRT scores
of 0 or 1) and high CRT score group (CRT scores of 2 or 3).
Figure 2.4 shows the results. Under both metrics, subjects with high CRT scores more
frequently decided optimally than did those with low CRT scores. Compared with the group
with low CRT scores, the group with high CRT scores solved 19.1% more problems optimally
in the days of supply treatment and 31.1% more problems optimally in the inventory turn rate
treatment. Both differences are significant (Wilcoxon test, one-sided, p = 0.040 and p = 0.017,
respectively), which provides support for Hypotheses 2.2(a) and 2.2(b).
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The results also indicate that the effect of the CRT score on performance is higher under
the inventory turn rate metric than under the days of supply metric. We test the significance
of the differences using a fractional logit model (Papke and Wooldridge 1996) with the fraction
of optimal decisions as the dependent variable (see Table 2.3). Metric equals one in the days
of supply treatment and zero in the inventory turn rate treatment. CRT equals one if the
subject belongs to the high CRT score group and zero otherwise. The regression analysis
yields a significant effect for the metric and the CRT group but a non-significant effect for
the interaction of CRT group and metric.
We used the CRT score as an indicator of System 2 thinking in our analyses. To analyze
the robustness of the results, we considered alternative indicators for System 2 thinking, that
is, decision time (Dane and Pratt 2007) and calculator use (Rosenboim et al. 2013). We
replaced the variable CRT in the regressions with the variables Time (average time that a
subject required to reach a decision) and Calculator (number of decisions in which subjects
used a calculator). The results of the corresponding regressions are shown in Table 2.3.
For decision time, the results are similar to those for CRT score, but the significance levels
are higher. For calculator use, the results are also similar and more pronounced. Using a
calculator does not significantly improve decisions in the days of supply treatment (p = 0.721),
but using one does in the inventory turn rate treatment (p < 0.001). Note that the interaction
term is also significant (p = 0.050), indicating that calculator use has significantly lower value
in the days of supply than in the inventory turn rate treatment.
Overall, the results show that optimal investment decisions are made more frequently in
the days of supply than in the inventory turn rate treatment. The results also indicate that
System 2 thinking (operationalized by high CRT score, long decision time, and calculator
use) is beneficial, in particular if the inventory turn rate is used.
We conducted the experiments in a controlled laboratory environment at the University
of Cologne. The subjects were pre-experienced students from the faculty of Management,
Economics and Social Sciences with an average age of 23.6 years and little or no work
experience. Given the background of the students, it is unlikely that they had experience in
making investment decisions, such as those that they made in the experiment. To analyze
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Table 2.3 Effect of System 2 Thinking on Performance in Investment Decisions
CRT score Decision time Calculator use
Variable DOS only ITR only Full sample DOS only ITR only Full sample DOS only ITR only Full sample
Metric 1.822∗∗ 3.169∗∗∗ 3.252∗∗∗(0.667) (0.640) (0.504)
CRT 1.762∗∗ 1.288∗∗ 1.288∗∗(0.758) (0.587) (0.582)
CRT xMetric 0.474(0.952)
Time 0.017 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Time xMetric −0.013(0.015)
Calculator 0.104 0.799∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗(0.292) (0.203) (0.202)
Calculator xMetric −0.694∗∗(0.354)
Constant 1.128∗∗∗ −0.693 −0.693 1.675∗∗∗ −1.493∗∗∗ −1.493∗∗∗ 2.058∗∗∗ −1.193∗∗∗ −1.193∗∗∗(0.503) (0.447) (0.443) (0.458) (0.451) (0.449) (0.403) (0.306) (0.305)
Log-likelihood −10.75 −17.14 −27.90 −17.34 −29.32 −46.66 −17.72 −27.87 −45.58
Observations 34 31 65 59 55 114 59 55 114
Notes. Fractional logit regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses.∗ p-value < 0.10, ∗∗ p-value < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p-value < 0.01, two-tailed.
DOS = days of supply, ITR = inventory turn rate.
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Table 2.4 Inventory Investment Decisions of Managers (N = 51)
Berlin Munich Stockholm Total
Metric Subjects Optimal Subjects Optimal Subjects Optimal Subjects Optimal
Days of supply 5 2 (40.0%) 9 9 (100%) 9 6 (66.7%) 23 17(73.9%)
Inventory turn rate 3 0 (0%) 10 7 (70.0%) 15 6 (40.0%) 28 13(46.4%)
whether individuals with experience in investment decisions are also subject to the decision
biases we observed with students, we conducted an additional experiment with actual supply
chain managers.
2.4.5 Experiment With Managers
We identified three business conferences that targeted managers at the vice presidential level
and above and addressed inventory optimization: the Inventory Optimization Workshop in
Berlin (Marcus Evans 2013), the Supply Chain Executive Academy in Munich (Supply Chain
Academy 2013), and the Spare Parts Business Platform in Stockholm (Copperberg 2013).
At the conferences, we distributed questionnaires and asked the participants to consider a
warehouse where the inventory of three products can be optimized, but budget restrictions
allow them to optimize the inventory of only one product (Supplementary Material 2.B). The
products had the same unit costs and demand rates. In the days of supply treatment, days of
supply could be reduced from (A) 120 to 90 days, (B) 36 to 18 days, or (C) 15 to 9 days. In
the inventory turn rate treatment, we provided the corresponding inventory turn rates that
could be increased from (A) 3 to 4 turns per year, (B) 10 to 20 turns per year, or (C) 24 to
40 turns per year. In both treatments, A is the optimal choice.
The results of the experiment are shown in Table 2.4. At all conferences, the managers
performed better under the days of supply metric than under the inventory turn rate metric.
Under the days of supply metric, 73.9% of the decisions were optimal, a fraction that is
significantly higher than the fraction of 46.6% optimal decisions under the inventory turn
rate metric (Wilcoxon test, one-sided, p = 0.025).
There is substantial heterogeneity in the results across conferences, which could be attributed
to the relatively small sample sizes per conference, the different backgrounds of the participants,
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or the different topics covered at the conferences before the experiment. To control for such
factors in the analysis, we conducted a logistic regression analysis with the metric as the
independent variable and the binary decision as the dependent variable, using fixed effects
for the conferences. The regression shows a significant effect of the metric on the decision
(odds ratio = 0.178, p = 0.024). The results of this experiment indicate that the investment
decisions of supply chain managers are affected by the equivalent metric used and provide
additional support for Hypothesis 2.1.
2.5 Study 2: Effect of Performance Metrics on Effort
Companies continuously seek to increase their operational efficiency and reduce inventory
levels by, for instance, implementing lean management practices and continuous process
improvements (Chen et al. 2005, 2007, Alan et al. 2014). Such activities require effort. We
analyze how the effort that people invest is affected by the performance metric used. Because
different performance metrics assign different values to the effect of effort, the choice of metric
can influence employee motivation and effort.
2.5.1 Behavioral Effort Model
Consider an individual who must determine the effort to invest in inventory optimization. We
denote the effort cost function by E(a) and assume that the function is convex and increasing
in the effort level a. The effort that the decision maker invests determines the inventory level.
We denote the inventory level function by I(a) and the initial inventory level by I(0). The
function is strictly convex decreasing in effort and converges to a positive inventory level
as effort goes to infinity. This functional form models the standard setting, in which more
beneficial improvements are implemented before less beneficial ones. The monetary value of
the inventory reduction associated with effort level a is VM(a) = c(I(0) − I(a)).
The days of supply metric has the following value at effort level a:
VT (a) = t
d
(I(0) − I(a)) −E(a). (2.12)
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A decision maker who places weight 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 on the metric and weight (1 − w) on the
inventory value assigns the value
ṼT (a) = w t
d
(I(0) − I(a)) + (1 −w)c (I(0) − I(a)) −E(a) (2.13)
to effort level a.
The inventory turn rate metric has the following value at effort level a:
VR(a) = rd( 1
I(a) − 1I(0)) −E(a). (2.14)
A decision maker who places weight 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 on the metric and weight (1 − w) on the
inventory value assigns the value
ṼR(a) = wrd( 1
I(a) − 1I(0)) + (1 −w)c (I(0) − I(a)) −E(a) (2.15)
to effort level a.
We are interested in comparing the optimal effort levels under the days of supply and
inventory turn rate metrics, which requires specifying the parameters t and r. For our analyses,
we use the parameter values at the initial effort level, that is, t = cd and r = cI2(0)/d. All
results still hold if the parameters are determined at any effort level between zero and the
optimal effort level under the days of supply metric.
The function ṼT (a) is convex in the effort level, and the optimal effort level under the days
of supply metric solves the first-order condition −cI ′(a∗T ) = E′(a∗T ). At this effort level, the
first derivative of the function ṼR(a) is
Ṽ ′R(a∗T ) = (1 − I2(0)I2(a∗T ))wcI ′(a∗T ). (2.16)
Ṽ ′R(a∗T ) is non-negative for 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 and strictly positive for 0 < w ≤ 1, which implies that
the optimal effort level under the inventory turn rate metric is higher than the optimal effort
level under the days of supply metric, that is, for individuals who place some weight on the
metric. We hypothesize the following:
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Hypothesis 2.3. The average effort is higher under the inventory turn rate metric than
under the days of supply metric.
2.5.2 Effort Experiment
We analyzed the effect of the metrics on effort in a laboratory experiment, in which human
subjects invested real effort to reduce inventory. The experiment used two treatments, a
days of supply treatment and an inventory turn rate treatment, that differed only in how the
performance of the inventory system was indicated.
All experimental sessions followed the same protocol. Subjects received written instructions
about the experiment that explained how the performance metrics are computed and provided
examples (Supplementary Material 2.C). Subjects were informed that they had to manage
the inventory of a single product with an annual demand rate of 10,000 units and an initial
average inventory level of 5,000 units. They were told the initial values of the performance
metrics, that is, the initial value of the days of supply metric of 180 days or the initial value
of the inventory turn rate metric of 2 per year. Subjects were informed that they could invest
effort to reduce inventory and would receive a payment of 10 ECUs for each unit of inventory
reduction. They were also informed that the exchange rate would be 1 euro per 5,000 ECUs.
We decided to design a real effort experiment because real work better captures fatigue,
boredom, excitement and other affectations not present in monetary effort designs (see, for
example, van Dijk et al. 2001, Carpenter et al. 2010). The effort task required subjects to
position sliders on a computer screen using the computer mouse (Gill and Prowse 2012). The
instructions stated the relationship between effort, measured by the number of sliders moved
correctly from the initial position of 0 to the target position of 50, and average inventory:
Average inventory level = 5,000 units
1 + 0.1 ⋅Number of sliders positioned correctly . (2.17)
Before the actual experiment, subjects completed a quiz consisting of five questions to
ensure that they understood the effect of their effort on the average inventory level and the
performance metric. The first question concerned the functional relationship between the
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inventory level and the performance metric. The second question asked for the initial average
inventory level (5,000 units) and the third question for the initial value of the performance
metric (180 days or 2 per year). The fourth question asked for the inventory level after
the first ten sliders were positioned correctly (2,500 units). The fifth question asked for the
corresponding value of the performance metric (90 days or 4 per year).
If all five questions were answered correctly on the first attempt, subjects received 1,000
ECUs. If they needed two attempts, they received 500 ECUs. If they needed more than two
attempts, they did not receive any compensation for completing the quiz. Subjects could
not continue without having answered all five questions correctly; 113 subjects needed one
attempt, five subjects needed two attempts, and ten subjects needed more than two attempts.
After the quiz, the actual experiment started. The experiment was played in rounds. At
the beginning of a round, a screen with 48 sliders appeared, all set at an initial value of zero
(see Supplementary Material 2.C for a screenshot). Subjects had two minutes to position
up to 48 sliders and were informed of the time remaining in each round. In the experiment,
the maximum number of sliders that a subject positioned correctly in a round was 28. After
a slider was positioned correctly, the performance metric was updated. After each round,
subjects could decide whether they wanted to stay for another round or to terminate the
experiment. Subjects were informed that they could play as many rounds as they wished. We
had to terminate the experiment for one subject in the inventory turn rate treatment after 50
rounds (nearly 120 minutes total) to avoid overlap with subjects of the subsequent session.
A total of 128 students from the faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences of
the University of Cologne were recruited via the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner
2004). We ran 48 sessions and invited three students per session. To avoid having subjects
who terminated the experiment affecting the effort decisions of other subjects, we placed
the subjects into individual rooms, such that they could not observe one another. Subjects
arrived at the instructor’s office and were randomly assigned to treatments and rooms; 65
subjects were assigned to the days of supply treatment and 63 to the inventory turn rate
treatment. The average compensation was 9.62 euros.
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Figure 2.5 Effect of Metric on Average Invested Effort and Average Final Inventory Value
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2.5.3 Results
Figure 2.5 summarizes the results. It shows that subjects, on average, invested more effort
in the inventory turn rate treatment than in the days of supply treatment: They moved
significantly more sliders (Wilcoxon test, one-sided, p = 0.011) and played significantly more
rounds (Wilcoxon test, one-sided, p = 0.025), which provides support for Hypothesis 2.3. The
figure also depicts the average final inventory level under both metrics. In the inventory turn
rate treatment, the final inventory level was significantly lower than in the days of supply
treatment (Wilcoxon test, one-sided, p = 0.011).
The results can be explained by the non-linear relationship between the inventory turn rate
metric and the inventory value, which leads individuals to overestimate the impact of the
effort they invested in inventory reduction. Therefore, it is more likely that an individual
exerts higher effort and achieves lower inventory levels under the inventory turn rate than
under the days of supply metric.
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2.6 Study 3: Effect of Performance Metrics on Inventory Decisions
The two fundamental inventory models used in supply chain management are the economic
order quantity model (Harris 1990, Erlenkotter 1990) and the newsvendor model (Arrow
et al. 1951). A large body of literature exists that analyzes variations and extensions of these
models (see, for example, Zipkin 2000). More recently, the behavioral aspects of inventory
management have been addressed (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, Bolton et al. 2012, and the
references therein). The focus of this stream of research has been on analyzing decision biases
and human preferences in the newsvendor setting. Our interest is in understanding the effect
of inventory metrics on decision making, and we will use the simpler economic order quantity
model for our analyses.
2.6.1 Behavioral Inventory Model
The economic order quantity model considers ordering and inventory holding costs. Each time
an order is placed, a fixed order cost of K is charged. Orders are delivered instantaneously
and placed in inventory, where they are held at an inventory holding cost per unit of h. The
demand rate d is deterministic and constant, and all demand is filled from inventory.
The classical economic order quantity model considers an operational perspective and
analyzes how optimal order quantities of individual products can be determined. The decision
variable is typically order quantity, which is the key decision variable for inventory planners,
who are in charge of placing orders with suppliers. Inventory managers who are responsible
for managing larger organizational entities, such as departments, typically use aggregated
metrics to assess inventory performance (Harrison and New 2002, Cohen et al. 2007). Their
focus is on managing the budget, and they are often confronted with monetary decisions.
We consider such a monetary decision problem, in which a decision maker must determine
the ordering cost k and the resulting inventory is indicated by an inventory metric. With
ordering cost k, n = k/K orders can be placed per year, which results in an average inventory
level of d/2n = dK/2k. The higher the ordering cost is, the higher the ordering frequency
and the lower the average inventory level. The total costs are k + hdK/2k, and the optimal
ordering cost is k∗ = √hdK/2.
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If inventory is valued only by the days of supply metric, the value associated with ordering
cost k is
VT (k) = t
d
(I(K) − dK
2k
) , (2.18)
where I(K) denotes the initial inventory level. A decision maker who places weight 0 ≤ w ≤ 1
on the metric and weight (1−w) on the inventory value and who initializes t at k =K assigns
the value
ṼT (k) = wh(I(K) − dK2k ) + (1 −w)h(I(K) − dK2k ) − k = h(I(K) − dK2k ) − k (2.19)
to ordering cost k.
Under the inventory turn rate metric, the value is
VR(k) = rd( 2k
dK
− 1
I(K)) − k. (2.20)
A decision maker who places weight 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 on the metric and weight (1 − w) on the
inventory value and who initializes r at k =K assigns the value
ṼR(k) = whI2(K)( 2k
dK
− 1
I(K)) + (1 −w)h(I(K) − dK2k ) − k, (2.21)
to ordering cost k.
To compare the optimal ordering cost under the two metrics, we first analyze the optimal
ordering cost under the days of supply metric. The function ṼT (k) is concave in ordering
cost k, and the first-order condition yields an optimal ordering cost of k∗T = √hdK/2. The
function ṼR(k) is also concave in ordering cost k. At the optimal ordering cost k∗T , the first
derivative of the function ṼR(k) is
ṼR(k) = wdh − 2K2K . (2.22)
The first derivative at the optimal ordering cost is strictly positive for situations in which it
is more expensive to hold the annual demand in inventory than placing one order (dh/2 >K)
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and where individuals place some weight on the metric (w > 0). The first condition holds
for most real inventory systems, and the second condition holds if individuals rely, to some
extent, on the metric. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2.4. Average ordering costs are greater under the inventory turn rate metric
than under the days of supply metric.
2.6.2 Inventory Experiment
We conducted a laboratory experiment in which subjects had to determine the ordering costs
of three products with different inventory holding costs per unit. The experiment used two
treatments, a days of supply treatment and an inventory turn rate treatment, that differed
only in how the inventory level was indicated.
All experimental sessions followed the same protocol. Upon entering the lab, subjects
received written instructions (Supplementary Material 2.D). Subjects were informed that they
had to manage the inventory of three products with identical demand rates of 10,000 units
per product but with different inventory holding costs per unit. Subjects had to determine
the ordering costs of the products. They were informed that the higher that they set the
ordering cost, the lower the average inventory level and the corresponding inventory holding
cost for this product would be. For holding inventory, subjects incurred costs of h ECUs
per average unit on hand. The inventory holding costs per unit h were 10, 15, and 20. The
minimum ordering cost was 100 ECUs. Subjects received an endowment of 45,000 ECUs from
which the total costs were deducted. The exchange rate was 1 euro per 5,000 ECUs.
Before the actual experiment, subjects completed a computerized quiz consisting of seven
questions, separated into three parts, to ensure that they understood the relationship among
ordering cost, inventory holding cost, and the performance metric to which they were exposed.
The first part concerned the functional relationships among ordering cost, performance metrics,
and inventory holding cost. In the second part, we asked subjects to determine the average
inventory level for two values of the performance metric. In the third part, subjects had to
determine the effects of decreases in the inventory level on the inventory holding cost for
three different inventory holding costs per unit. If all questions within a part were answered
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correctly on the first attempt, subjects received 2,000 ECUs. If they needed two attempts,
they received 1,000 ECUs. If they needed more than two attempts, they did not receive any
compensation for answering the corresponding part. Subjects could not continue without
having answered all seven questions correctly. For the first part, 111 subjects needed one
attempt, 13 subjects needed two attempts, and one subject needed more than two attempts.
The corresponding frequencies for the second and third part are 115, 8, and 2 and 93, 28, and
4, respectively.
The experiment was implemented and conducted with the software z-tree (Fischbacher
2007). After they had made their investment decisions, subjects completed a post-experimental
questionnaire, and we collected demographic data.
A total of 125 students of from the faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences
of the University of Cologne were recruited via the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner
2004), and each subject participated in one of four sessions. Upon entering the laboratory,
each subject was randomly assigned to one of two treatments, which resulted in 61 subjects
for the days of supply treatment and 64 subjects for the inventory turn rate treatment. The
sessions lasted 40 minutes on average, and the average payment was 8.44 euros, including a
participation fee of four euros.
2.6.3 Results
The average ordering cost under the different inventory holding costs per unit are shown
in Figure 2.6. For all products, ordering costs were higher under the inventory turn rate
metric than under the days of supply metric. On average, the total ordering cost was 9,654
ECUs under the inventory turn rate metric and 69.5% higher than that of 5,695 ECUs under
the days of supply metric. The difference in total ordering cost is significant (Wilcoxon
test, one-sided, p < 0.001), as are the differences for the individual products (Wilcoxon test,
one-sided, p = 0.004 for h = 10 and p < 0.001 for h = 15 and h = 20). We conclude that subjects
set a higher ordering cost, on average, under the inventory turn rate metric than under the
days of supply metric, which provides support for Hypothesis 2.4.
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Figure 2.6 Effect of Metric on Average Ordering Cost
1,474
1,851
2,3702,352
3,322
3,981
h = 10 h = 15 h = 20
+79.5%
+68.0%
+59.6%
(k* = 2,200) (k* =2,700) (k* = 3,200)
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Note. Error bars indicate one standard error.
Figure 2.6 also indicates that ordering costs tend to be below optimality under the days of
supply metric and above optimality under the inventory turn rate metric. Our model did not
predict the below-optimal ordering cost that we observed in the experiment under the days
of supply metric. However, this effect can be explained by prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979) and mental accounting (Thaler 1985), if the ordering cost were framed as a loss.
Such losses typically loom larger than equivalent gains, which would explain the below-optimal
order quantities in the days of supply treatment. Assuming that mental accounts and loss
aversions are the same in both treatments, the behavioral models continue to predict the
difference in ordering cost as stated in Hypothesis 4.
Because the cost function is steeper below than above the optimal solution, a given
deviation from the optimal ordering cost is more costly below than above the optimum. This
explains why the average total costs of 29,493 ECUs under the inventory turn rate metric
are significantly below those of 42,555 ECUs under the days of supply metric (Wilcoxon test,
two-sided, p = 0.009).
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2.7 Discussion and Managerial Implications
We analyzed the effect of performance metrics on decision making and considered two
equivalent metrics, days of supply and inventory turn rate. The relationship between days
of supply and inventory value is linear, such that valuations that are based on the days of
supply metric are proportional to those that are based on inventory value. The relationship
between inventory turn rate and inventory value is convex, such that inventory reductions
that are evaluated based on this metric are over-valued. We hypothesized that people decide
differently under the two metrics and found support for our hypotheses in three laboratory
experiments.
In the first experiment, we considered investment decisions and showed that most decisions
are correct under the days of supply metric and incorrect under the inventory turn rate
metric. To better understand the heterogeneity in the decisions of the inventory turn rate
treatment, we applied dual process theory and found that individuals with high cognitive
reflection more frequently decide optimally than those with low cognitive reflection. In the
second experiment, we analyzed effort decisions and showed that individuals invest more
effort under the inventory turn rate metric than under the days of supply metric. In the third
experiment, we analyzed inventory decisions and showed that individuals choose a higher
ordering cost under the inventory turn rate metric than under the days of supply metric.
In some situations, one metric is clearly superior to the other metric. In the investment
decision study, for instance, individuals made better decisions under the days of supply metric
than under the inventory turn rate metric, and thus, the days of supply metric is the superior
choice. If this metric cannot be used, for instance, because corporate guidelines require using
the inventory turn rate metric, decision making can still be improved by activating System
2 thinking of the decision makers. This can be supported, for instance, by reducing the
emotional and cognitive load, by avoiding time pressure, and by avoiding multi-tasking during
decision making.
In other situations, it is less clear which metric should be used. In our real effort study,
individuals invested more effort under the inventory turn rate metric than under the days
of supply metric. In situations, in which an employee is solely responsible for a dedicated
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activity, such as managing raw material, work in process inventory, or finished goods inventory,
the inventory turn rate metric can motivate the employee to continuously reduce inventory.
However, employees investing more effort in inventory optimization have less capacity to invest
in alternative activities. Employees with broader responsibilities who must also determine
the activities in which to invest effort might be misguided by the inventory turn rate metric
and focus on reducing inventory in areas where inventory is already low instead of areas
with substantial inventory reduction potential or in other valuable activities. Furthermore, it
may demotivate employees when they realize that the increase they perceived in the metric
does not lead to a similar payment. If an employee is compensated based on changes in the
inventory value, he or she might consider the change in the metric as a reference point (Bell
1985, Loomes and Sugden 1986, Kőszegi and Rabin 2006) for the size of a bonus payment. If
bonus payments fall short of such expectation-based reference points, work satisfaction and
performance might suffer (Ockenfels et al. 2015).
In our inventory management experiment, individuals chose higher order cost under the
inventory turn rate metric than under the days of supply metric, which was predicted by the
behavioral model. However, our model did not predict the below-optimal ordering cost that
we observed in the experiment under the days of supply metric. This effect can be explained
by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and mental accounting (Thaler 1985), if
the ordering cost were framed as a loss. Better understanding such behavioral biases seems a
promising area for future research.
Our research suggests various other areas for future research. We focused on inventory
management, but we expect that our insights are generalizable. In engineering, reliability
can be measured by the time between failures and the failure rate, and in warehousing,
performance can be measured by the picking time and the picking rate. We expect that
investment decisions will be more frequently optimal under the time than under the rate
metrics in both settings but that the motivation to continuously invest effort in optimizing
individual areas would be higher under the rate than under the time metrics. Similar examples
exist in other supply chain areas and other business functions, and it would be interesting to
analyze how approaches similar to ours can be applied to them.
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We considered equivalent metrics, where one was the inverse of the other. Many equivalent
metrics have this property, but there are other equivalent metrics. For instance, in operations
management, service performance can be measured by the fraction of filled demand or the
fraction of lost sales. Similarly, equipment performance can be measured by the uptime and
the downtime. One metric frames performance as gains, while the other frames it as losses,
which might affect how people value the outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky
and Kahneman 1981). Analyzing such effects offers interesting opportunities that we leave to
future research.
Beyond the decision biases that are rooted in solid theory, biases that have not received
much attention can have considerable effects on valuations. Green (2014), for instance,
reported on a failed new product introduction by the A&W restaurant chain that introduced
a new third pounder hamburger to rival the McDonald’s Quarter Pounder. The A&W burger
had more meat, was preferred in taste tests, and was less expensive, but did not sell well.
Customer focus groups revealed the reason: “Why, [customers] asked the researchers, should
they pay the same amount for a third of a pound of meat as they did for a quarter-pound of
meat at McDonald’s.” As the example illustrates, it is important to understand how metrics
affect valuation.
45
Supplementary Materials
The following instructions are translated from German. We present the instructions for the
inventory turn rate treatments. In the days of supply treatments, the instructions differ from
those of the inventory turn rate treatment only in the metric used to measure inventory
performance.
2.A Instructions Investment Experiment
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please do not talk to each other
from now on, turn off your mobile phones, and put away all your personal belongings.
We ask you to read all instructions carefully. If you have any questions, feel free to raise your
hand. The experimenter will then come to you and answer your questions in private. Moreover,
after reading the instructions you will have the chance to ask questions in case anything
remained unclear. All decisions are made anonymously and will be treated confidentially.
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you will earn depends on your decisions.
Your earnings in the course of this experiment are expressed in a virtual unit of currency –
the experimental currency unit (ECU). At the end of the experiment, you will receive 1 euro
per 3,000 ECUs earned during this experiment. In addition, you will receive a show-up fee of
2.50 euros.
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Introduction
The inventory turn rate metric is a measure commonly used in warehousing. It is defined as
the annual demand rate divided by the average inventory level. The inventory turn rate thus
indicates how many times per year the average inventory level of a product is completely
depleted and replenished.
Example:
A company sells 10,000 units per year of a product. The average inventory level is 5,000 units.
What is the inventory turn rate?
Inventory turn rate = Annual demand rate
Average inventory level
= 10,000 units/year
5,000 units
= 2/year
At constant demand rate, an increase in the average inventory level causes a reduction in the
inventory turn rate.
At constant demand rate, a reduction in the average inventory level causes an increase in the
inventory turn rate.
Task description
You are in charge of a warehouse, and you will be evaluated on the basis of the average
inventory level. Your warehouse contains two products featuring different inventory turn
rates. From each product, 10,000 units are sold per year. The unit holding costs are the same
for both products.
In each round, you can optimize the inventory management for one of the two products
and thus reduce the average inventory level of this product. You will receive a bonus for each
unit you reduce your average inventory level. There are no costs for the optimization itself.
You will know the current inventory turn rates of both products and how the inventory
turn rates will change after the optimization. In each round, it is your task to select one of
the two products for which you want to optimize inventory management.
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Experimental protocol
The sequence of the experiment is as follows:
I. Decisions: You will decide in three independent rounds for which product you want to
optimize the inventory management. You will receive a bonus for each unit you reduce
your average inventory level.
II. Questions: You will answer three short questions.
III. Questionnaire: You will answer general questions regarding your attitudes and prefer-
ences.
IV. Questionnaire: Finally, you will answer general questions regarding the experiment and
your person.
Payment
Your payment depends on the inventory reduction achieved over all three rounds. For each unit
you reduce the average inventory level, you will receive 10 ECUs. At the end of the experiment,
you will receive 1 euro per 3,000 ECUs that you have earned during the experiment. In
addition, you will receive a show-up fee of 2.50 euros.
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2.B Instructions Validation Experiment With Managers
Definition
Inventory turn rate = Annual demand rate
Average inventory level
Situation
You are in charge of a warehouse and you have discovered room for inventory optimization
for products A, B, and C. Unfortunately, your budget restrictions allow just one optimization.
You know the current inventory turns and how they will change after investing in inventory
optimization.
Product A B C 
	
 	 10,000 10,000 10,000 
Unit cost (€) 500 500 500 
Inventory turn rate
Current situation 3 10 24 
After optimization 4 20 40 
You are evaluated by average inventory value. Which product would you invest in?
At your company, which of the following metrics is used to measure inventory performance?
2 Inventory turn rate
2 Days of supply
2 Both
2 Other (please specify):
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2.C Instructions Effort Experiment
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please turn off your mobile
phone, and put away all your personal belongings. We ask you to read all instructions carefully.
All decisions are made anonymously and will be treated confidentially.
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you will earn depends on your decisions
and your exerted effort. Your earnings in the course of this experiment are expressed in a
virtual unit of currency – the experimental currency unit (ECU). At the end of the experiment,
you will receive 1 euro per 5,000 ECUs earned during this experiment.
Introduction
The inventory turn rate metric is a measure commonly used in warehousing. It is defined as
the annual demand rate divided by the average inventory level. The inventory turn rate thus
indicates how many times per year the average inventory level of a product is completely
depleted and replenished.
Example:
A company sells 10,000 units per year of a product. The average inventory level is 5,000 units.
What is the inventory turn rate?
Inventory turn rate = Annual demand rate
Average inventory level
= 10,000 units/year
5,000 units
= 2/year
At constant demand rate, an increase in the average inventory level causes a reduction in the
inventory turn rate.
At constant demand rate, a reduction in the average inventory level causes an increase in the
inventory turn rate.
50
Chapter 2 Equivalent Inventory Metrics: A Behavioral Perspective
Situation
You are in charge of a warehouse with a single product, and you will be evaluated on the
basis of the average inventory level. Currently, your warehouse contains on average 5,000
units of this product. 10,000 units are sold per year. Therefore, the initial inventory turn
rate of your warehouse is 2 per year.
Depending on your effort, you can now optimize your inventory management and increase
your inventory turn rate. You will receive a bonus of 10 ECUs for each unit you reduce your
average inventory level.
Task description
In this experiment your effort will be simulated by moving sliders. The sliders are initially
positioned at “0” (see Figure 1 (a)). By using the mouse, you can position the slider at any
integer value between “0” and “100”. The more sliders you correctly position at the target
position “50” (see Figure 1 (b)), the more you can reduce your average inventory level. You
can adjust each slider an unlimited number of times. In each round, you have 120 seconds to
do so.
(a) Initial position at “0” (b) Target position at “50”
Figure 1 Initial and target position of a slider
The average inventory level depends on the number of sliders positioned correctly as follows:
Average inventory level = 5,000 units
1 + 0.1 ⋅Number of sliders positioned correctly
The inventory turn rate is calculated accordingly:
Inventory turn rate = Annual demand rate
Average inventory level
= 10,000 units/year
Average inventory level
Please note that the demand rate stays constant over all rounds.
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Sequence of a round
In each round, the sequence is identical. Each round begins with an input screen with 48
sliders (see Figure 2). By positioning the sliders (moving them to the target position of “50”),
you can reduce the average inventory level. For this task, you have 120 seconds per round.
Within this time, you can freely decide how many sliders you want to position. In the upper
part of the input window, you can track how the inventory turn rate changes, once you have
positioned a slider correctly.
Figure 2 Input screen
At the end of each round, on the result screen, you will be informed of the extent to
which you were able to increase the inventory turn rate of your warehouse. Once you press
“continue”, the input screen (Figure 2) appears again and the next round starts.
Please note that you will start the next round with the inventory turn rate you have
achieved in the previous round. This means that you can continuously reduce your average
inventory level over all rounds.
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It is up to you how many rounds you exert effort. If you do not want to exert any more
effort, please press “terminate experiment” on the result screen. You will then immediately
receive your payment for the inventory reduction you achieved until then and are free to leave.
Experimental protocol
The sequence of the experiment is as follows:
I. Comprehension questions: First, you will answer some comprehension questions. You
must answer all questions correctly to reach the next stage of the experiment. You will
receive a bonus if you can answer all questions correctly on the first or second attempt.
II. Effort task: You can exert effort and thus reduce the average inventory level. It is up
to you how many rounds to exert effort.
III. Questionnaire: Finally, you will answer general questions regarding the experiment and
your person.
Payment
Your payment depends on the achieved inventory reduction over all rounds. For each unit you
reduce the average inventory level, you will receive 10 ECUs. At the end of the experiment,
you will receive 1 euro per 5,000 ECUs that you have earned during the experiment.
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2.D Instructions Inventory Decision Experiment
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please do not talk to each other
from now on, turn off your mobile phones, and put away all your personal belongings.
We ask you to read all instructions carefully. If you have any questions, feel free to raise your
hand. The experimenter will then come to you and answer your questions in private. Moreover,
after reading the instructions, you will have the chance to ask questions in case anything
remained unclear. All decisions are made anonymously and will be treated confidentially.
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you will earn depends on your decisions.
Your earnings in the course of this experiment are expressed in a virtual unit of currency –
the experimental currency unit (ECU). At the end of the experiment, you will receive 1 euro
per 5,000 ECUs earned during this experiment. In addition, you will receive a show-up fee of
4 euros.
Introduction
The inventory turn rate metric is a measure commonly used in warehousing. It is defined as
the annual demand rate divided by the average inventory level. The inventory turn rate thus
indicates how many times per year the average inventory level of a product is completely
depleted and replenished.
Example:
A company sells 10,000 units per year of a product. The average inventory level is 5,000 units.
What is the inventory turn rate?
Inventory turn rate = Annual demand rate
Average inventory level
= 10,000 units/year
5,000 units
= 2/year
At constant demand rate, an increase in the average inventory level causes a reduction in the
inventory turn rate.
At constant demand rate, a reduction in the average inventory level causes an increase in the
inventory turn rate.
54
Chapter 2 Equivalent Inventory Metrics: A Behavioral Perspective
Situation
You are in charge of a warehouse with three different products, and you will be evaluated on
the basis of total annual cost. From each product, 10,000 units are sold per year.
You have to decide how much you want to invest per year in the order processing of each
product. The more you invest in the order processing of a product, the higher the inventory
turn rate and the lower the average inventory level, as well as the corresponding holding cost
for this product.
For holding inventory, you incur costs of h ECUs per average unit on hand. The unit
holding cost parameter h varies from product to product and will be displayed on the input
screen.
You can adjust your decisions an unlimited number of times and display the corresponding
turn rates before you submit your decisions.
Payment
The annual cost per product can be broken down as follows:
Annual cost per product = Investment in order processing + h ⋅Average inventory level
The total annual costs are made up of the sum of the annual costs per product. In addition,
you will receive an endowment of 45,000 ECUs. Your profit will be calculated as follows:
Profit = 45,000 ECUs −Total annual cost
At the end of the experiment, you will receive 1 euro per 5,000 ECUs that you have earned
during the experiment. In addition, you will receive a show-up fee of 4 euros.
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Experimental protocol
The sequence of the experiment is as follows:
I. Comprehension questions: You will answer some comprehension questions.
II. Decision: You will decide how much to invest in order processing per year.
III. Questions: You will answer eight short questions.
IV. Questionnaire: You will answer general questions regarding your attitudes and prefer-
ences.
V. Questionnaire: You will answer general questions regarding the experiment and your
person.
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Chapter 3
Decision Making Under Service Level
Contracts: An Experimental Analysis
The ordering behavior of human decision makers under stochastic demand has been analyzed
for various supply contracts. A consistent finding is that people place orders that both deviate
from expected profit-maximizing quantities and exhibit high variability. We consider service
level contracts, commonly used in practice but receiving little attention in the behavioral
operations literature. Service level contracts have an interesting property that other supply
contracts do not offer. They can be parameterized, such that they have steep expected profit
functions around the expected profit-maximizing order quantity. We provide analytical models
and use a laboratory experiment to analyze ordering behavior under service level contracts
and compare the performance with that under wholesale price contracts, which have flat
expected profit functions. Our results indicate that properly designed service level contracts
can incentivize people to place close-to-optimal order quantities with low variability, resulting
in high efficiency. In our experiment, the efficiency that human subjects achieved under a
service level contract was 97.2%, compared with an efficiency of 88.1% under a wholesale
price contract.
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3.1 Introduction
We consider a standard setting in the supply chain literature, whereby a retailer orders
products from a supplier to fill her customers’ stochastic demand (see Cachon 2003 for an
overview). A good deal of this literature has focused on analyzing expected profit-maximizing
decision makers and whether various contracts incentivize first-best order quantities, that
is, order quantities that maximize expected channel profit. Among the contracts commonly
considered are the wholesale price contract (Arrow et al. 1951, Lariviere and Porteus 2001),
in which the retailer purchases products from the supplier at a unit wholesale price and bears
the full risk of excess inventory; the buyback contract (Pasternack 1985), in which the retailer
can return excess inventory to the supplier at a unit buyback price; and the revenue sharing
contract (Cachon and Lariviere 2005), in which the revenues of the retailer are shared with
the supplier.
A more recent stream of literature examines the ordering behavior of human decision makers.
This behavioral operations stream of research was initiated by Schweitzer and Cachon (2000).
They used laboratory experiments to analyze ordering behavior under a wholesale price
contract. The order quantities of their subjects deviated substantially from expected profit-
maximizing quantities and exhibited what has come to be known as the “pull-to-center” effect,
because observed average order quantities are regularly between expected profit-maximizing
quantities and mean demand. The pull-to-center effect has proven robust, holding under
various demand distributions (Benzion et al. 2008, 2010) and observed and unobserved lost
sales (Rudi and Drake 2014) and persists with experience and training (Bolton and Katok
2008, Bolton et al. 2012) and decision frequency (Bolton and Katok 2008, Bostian et al. 2008,
Lurie and Swaminathan 2009). The pull-to-center effect is not unique to the wholesale price
contract, having also been observed under buyback and revenue sharing contracts (Katok
and Wu 2009, Becker-Peth et al. 2013, Becker-Peth and Thonemann 2016).
One explanation for the pull-to-center effect, first put forward by Schweitzer and Cachon
(2000), is anchoring and insufficient adjustment, a learning heuristic by which people first make
decisions based on an initial anchor and tend to underweight additional information, thus
leading to insufficient adjustment and biasing subsequent decisions toward the initial anchor
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(Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971). Observed ordering behavior
reported in the behavioral operations literature is consistent with mean demand serving as an
anchor. Ordering behavior exhibits significant individual heterogeneity (Moritz et al. 2013),
and thus, it is unlikely that any single explanation will fit with all or most peoples’ ordering
behavior (Katok 2011). Nevertheless, some models perform well at capturing aggregate
trends in the data. Bostian et al. (2008) estimated the parameters of an adaptive learning
model (Camerer and Ho 1999) that tracks the observed data patterns in their newsvendor
experiment. Other explanations of the pull-to-center effect include bounded rationality (Su
2008), ex post inventory error minimization (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, Ho et al. 2010,
Kremer et al. 2014), overconfidence of decision makers (Ren and Croson 2013), and impulse
balance behavior (Ockenfels and Selten 2014, 2015). Although diverse in their approach, all
of these explanations share a broad theme in that all offer explanations for why learning is
insufficient to move ordering fully away from the anchor at mean demand to the optimal
order quantity.
Most supply contracts analyzed in the behavioral operations literature have relatively flat
expected profit functions. For the wholesale price contract analyzed in Schweitzer and Cachon
(2000), for example, order quantities that deviate by 10% from the expected profit-maximizing
quantities achieve expected profits that deviate by only approximately 1% from the maximum
expected profit. Buyback and revenue sharing contracts exhibit similar low sensitivities.
Bolton and Katok (2008) referred to this as the flat-maximum problem. Based on the findings
from Harrison (1989), who showed that increasing expected payoff differences between bidding
strategies in first price auctions improves learning and performance, Bolton and Katok (2008)
hypothesized that a steeper expected profit function might improve learning and reduce the
pull-to-center effect. Some learning theories, such as Bostian et al.’s (2008) model, also predict
faster learning when the expected profit function is steeper.
In this chapter, we analyze behavior under service level contracts; these specify the fraction
of demand that a retailer is obligated to fill and the penalty that must be paid by the
retailer if the realized service level is below the specified level. We show that by properly
parameterizing this type of contract, a steep expected profit function can be achieved. In
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addition, the stipulated service level might serve as an alternative anchor to average demand.
We investigate both of these potential effects on ordering behavior.
Service level contracts are commonly used in practice (Thonemann et al. 2003, Chen and
Thomas 2016). Analytical models have been developed that show how such contracts can
be parameterized to incentivize first-best order quantities for expected profit-maximizing
decision makers (Sieke et al. 2013 and the references therein). However, the behavior of
human decision makers under service level contracts has received relatively little attention,
with the notable exceptions of Katok et al. (2008) and Davis (2015). Katok et al. (2008)
analyzed the effect of the length of the review period on order decisions under a service level
contract and found that the order quantities of human decision makers increase in the length
of the review period. Davis (2015) analyzed human decision making under a contract type
that is similar to the service level contract that we consider. He analyzed a pull setting, under
which a supplier fills the demand of the retailer’s customers. In one of his experiments, the
retailer uses a service level contract, specifying a wholesale price and a bonus payment that
the retailer pays to the supplier if the supplier achieves an exogenously given service level.
Davis found that the retailer sets contract parameters suboptimally and that performance
under the service level contract is considerably below optimality but better than under a
wholesale price contract.
In this chapter, we provide a detailed analysis of human decision making behavior under
service level contracts. We use an analytical model to determine the contract parameters that
incentivize first-best order quantities for expected profit-maximizing retailers and conduct
a laboratory experiment with these contracts. We analyze performance under service level
contracts and show that they can achieve a high degree of efficiency if they are parameterized
properly, that is, if contract parameters are chosen to achieve steep expected profit functions.
Then, average order quantities are closer to the expected profit-maximizing quantity and
have lower variability than under a wholesale price contract that has a flatter expected profit
function. In our experiment, the efficiency under the service level contract is 97.2%, compared
with an efficiency of 88.1% under the wholesale price contract. We also designed an experiment
to analyze whether the performance improvement can be attributed to the steepness of the
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expected profit function or the potential anchoring effect of the service level. The results
indicate that performance can primarily be explained by the steepness of the expected profit
function whereas the anchoring effect of the service level does not seem to have a significant
effect on performance.
3.2 Theoretical Analysis of the Service Level Contract
We consider a standard supply chain setting with a single supplier and a single retailer
(Pasternack 1985, Lariviere and Porteus 2001, Cachon and Lariviere 2005). The retailer
chooses order quantity q and places it with the supplier. When determining the order quantity,
the retailer knows the distribution F (D) of demand D but not the demand realization d.
For our analyses, we assume that the demand density f(D) is logconcave and has strictly
positive support on its entire domain. Most distribution functions commonly used in inventory
management have this property (Rosling 2002) and it simplifies our theoretical analyses. The
supplier produces order quantity q and delivers it to the retailer at the unit wholesale price
w. The retailer sells the minimum of the order quantity q and demand d to customers at unit
revenue r. Excess inventory has no salvage value, and excess demand is lost. We refer to the
order quantity that maximizes the retailer’s expected profit as the optimal order quantity
and next show how it can be determined for wholesale price and service level contracts.
A wholesale price contract has a single parameter, the unit wholesale price w. For order
quantity q and demand realization d, the retailer’s profit is
piWP (w, q, d) = r min(q, d) −wq. (3.1)
The optimal order quantity is (Arrow et al. 1951)
q∗WP (w) = F−1 (r −wr ) (3.2)
and we denote the optimal expected profit by Π∗WP (w) = E [piWP (w, q∗WP (w), d)].
A service level contract specifies the fraction of demand that the retailer is obligated to fill
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Figure 3.1 Combinations of Service Levels and Unit Penalty Costs Incentivizing Optimal Order
Quantities of 75
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00
Service level s
Unit penalty cost p
s = 75% and p = 145
s = 100% and p = 12
Note. Demand is discrete and uniformly distributed between 1 and 100, and p is restricted to integers.
and the financial consequences of failing to do so. The fraction of demand that must be filled
is referred to as the service level s. For a demand realization of d units, the retailer must
fill at least sd units. If the retailer ordered fewer than sd units, a unit penalty cost of p is
charged for each unit difference between sd and q. If the retailer ordered at least sd units, no
penalty is charged. For order quantity q and demand realization d, the retailer’s profit is
piSL(s, p,w, q, d) = r min(q, d) −wq − p (sd − q)+ . (3.3)
The retailer’s optimal order quantity q∗SL(s, p,w) can be determined by solving (Sieke et al.
2013)
w − r (1 − F (q)) − p(1 − F (q
s
)) = 0 (3.4)
and we denote the optimal expected profit by Π∗SL(s, p,w) = E [piSL(s, p,w, q∗SL(s, p,w), d)].
The service level contract has three parameters and two degrees of freedom. Observe from
Equation (3.4) that a given optimal order quantity can be achieved by different combinations
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of the contract parameters. For instance, consider a supplier with a unit production cost of
c = 3, a unit revenue of r = 12, and uniformly distributed customer demand between 1 and
100. The expected supply chain profit-maximizing order quantity is q∗SC = F−1(0.75) = 75
units. For a service level contract with unit wholesale price w = 6, Figure 3.1 depicts the
combinations of service level s and unit penalty cost p for a retailer’s optimal order quantity
of q∗SL(s, p,w) = 75 units; for example, service level s = 75% and unit penalty cost p = 145,
service level s = 100% and unit penalty cost p = 12, or any combination of service level and
unit penalty cost on the curve.
Note that in the case of uniformly distributed demand between 1 and 100, the same demand
distribution as used in our experiment, and a unit wholesale price of w = 6, s = 75% is
the lowest service level that yields a profit-maximizing order quantity of 75. For instance,
imposing a service level of 65% as opposed to 75%, will not get the optimal order above 65
independent of the penalty p, because for order quantities of 65 or above the expected penalty
payment will be zero and hence there is no incentive to exceed an order quantity of 65.
Although the order quantity that maximizes expected profit is the same for all combinations
of s and p on the curve, the expected profit functions are different. For the extreme cases,
that is, for s = 75% and p = 145 and for s = 100% and p = 12, the expected profit functions are
depicted in Figure 3.2(a). The expected profit function of the wholesale price contract, which
we will use as a benchmark, is also shown. The graphs show that the contracts have the same
optimal order quantities but different optimal expected profits. For our analyses, it will prove
useful to scale the contracts, such that they have the same optimal expected profits. This
can be achieved by adding Π∗WP (w) −Π∗SL(s, p,w) to the profit function piSL(s, p,w, q, d) of
Equation (3.3). The results are shown in Figure 3.2(b).
The graphs in Figure 3.2(b) indicate that the service level contract with a low service
level and a high unit penalty cost (s = 75%, p = 145) has a steeper expected profit function
than that with a high service level and a low unit penalty cost (s = 100%, p = 12) and that
both service level contracts have steeper expected profit functions than the wholesale price
contract. The latter observation will be important for deriving our hypotheses, and the
following proposition states that it holds in general (all proofs are provided in the Section 3.7):
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Figure 3.2 Expected Profit Functions for Different Contracts with Optimal Order Quantity of 75
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Proposition 3.1. For all wholesale price contracts with 0 < w < r, there exists a service level
contract with the same optimal order quantity and a steeper expected profit function.
The steepness of the expected profit function is affected by the service level s and the unit
penalty cost p. The higher the service level, the higher is the expected number of units for
which the penalty cost must be paid and the lower the unit penalty cost can be, which results
in a flatter expected profit function (see Figure 3.2). The following proposition states the
effect of the service level on the steepness of the expected profit function:
Proposition 3.2. For a given optimal order quantity q∗, the steepness of the expected profit
function of the service level contract is decreasing in the service level s.
The proposition implies that the contract with the lowest service level and highest unit penalty
cost, in our example the contract with s = 75% and p = 145, has the steepest expected profit
function. Many of our analyses will rely on this contract. For notational convenience, we will
refer to it as the steep service level contract and to the contract with the flattest expected
profit function, that is, the contract with s = 100% and p = 12, as the flat service level contract.
Under a steep expected profit function, it is more costly to deviate with average orders from
the optimal quantity than under a flat expected profit function. A similar effect holds for the
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variability of order quantities, which we measure by within-subject standard deviations of
quantities because within-subject variability represents the extent to which a subject adjusts
his or her order quantities. Between-subject variability reflects the extent to which subjects
differ in their level behavior (Rudi and Drake 2014).
For concave expected profit functions, the marginal profit loss that is incurred by deviating
from the optimal order quantity is increasing in the distance between the order quantity and
the optimal order quantity. This implies that given order quantity q¯ ≤ q∗, ordering q¯ −∆q
instead of q¯ reduces the expected profit by more than ordering q¯ +∆q increases the expected
profit. If multiple orders are placed and they exhibit variability, the variability is more costly
the more concave the expected profit function is. The following proposition addresses this
implication for our contracts:
Proposition 3.3. For a given optimal order quantity q∗ and a given average order quantity
q¯, order variability is more costly under a service level contract than under a wholesale price
contract.
Both the steepness and concavity of the service level contract’s expected profit function are
decreasing in the service level s, which results in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.4. For a given optimal order quantity q∗ and a given average order quantity
q¯ ≤ q∗, the costliness of order variability is decreasing in the service level s.
3.3 Development of Hypotheses
In supply contracting experiments, actual order quantities deviate significantly from the
expected profit-maximizing quantities and exhibit substantial variability (see Section 3.1
for references). For example, the expected profits under a wholesale price contract in the
baseline treatments of Bolton et al. (2012) are 13.3% below optimality. In their experiment,
approximately one-half of the performance gap can be attributed to deviations of actual
average orders from order quantities and one-half to order variability. Other studies have
reported similar results (for example Rudi and Drake 2014), which indicates that two issues
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must be addressed to achieve efficient ordering behavior: average orders must be close to
expected profit-maximizing quantities and must exhibit low variability.
Bostian et al. (2008) hypothesized that suboptimal ordering behavior can be attributed to
the flatness of the expected profit function:
The flatness of the expected profit function in the neighborhood of [q∗] implies
a low average payoff penalty for choosing an order quantity that is merely close
to the optimum. As a result, subjects may not have an economic incentive to be
very circumspect in their decisions, and so lazy decision making could possibly
explain the pull-to-center effect. (p. 593)
Bolton and Katok (2008) offered similar arguments.
We are interested in measuring how the steepness of the expected profit function affects
ordering profits. To compare the steepnesses of different contracts, we use the sensitivity
of the expected profit function with respect to deviations of the order quantity from the
optimum.
Similar to Bostian et al. (2008), we define an anchor factor α to quantify the deviation of
actual average orders q¯ from the optimal order quantity q∗ toward the mean demand µ:
q¯ = αµ + (1 − α)q∗. (3.5)
Using the anchor factor α, which reflects the degree of the pull-to-center effect, we define
sensitivity:
α = 1 − Π (αµ + (1 − α)q∗)Π(q∗) . (3.6)
Sensitivity 40%, for instance, is the proportion of optimum expected profit that is lost if a
weight of 40% is placed on mean demand. For the wholesale price contract in Figure 3.2(b),
the sensitivity is 40% = 1.9%. The flatness of the expected profit function is not unique to the
wholesale price contract but can be observed under other supply contracts that have been
analyzed in the supply chain literature. Table 3.1 provides empirical estimates for the anchor
factor based on Equation (3.5) and the sensitivities of typical supply contracts.
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Table 3.1 Steepnesses of Selected Contracts Analyzed in the Literature
Contract parameters
Retail Wholesale Buyback Revenue
price price price share Sensitivity
Contract Authors Demand r w b λ α 40% 60%
WPC Schweitzer and Cachon 2000 U(1,300) 12 3 - - 60% 1.8% 4.1%
Bolton and Katok 2008 U(0,100) 12 3 - - 56% 1.9% 4.1%
Bostian et al. 2008 U(1,100) 4 1 - - 36% 1.9% 4.2%
Bolton et al. 2012a U(1,100) 12 3 - - 89% 1.9% 4.2%
Rudi and Drake 2014b N(1000,4002) 12 3 - - 70% 0.8% 1.8%
BBC Ren and Croson 2013 N(100,302) 10 4 2 - 93% 0.6% 1.3%
Katok and Wu 2009 U(0,100) 12 9 8 - 78% 1.9% 4.1%
U(50,150) 12 9 8 - 37% 0.8% 1.8%
RSC Katok and Wu 2009 U(0,100) 12 1 - 1/3 44% 1.9% 4.1%
U(50,150) 12 1 - 1/3 89% 0.8% 1.8%
Notes. WPC = wholesale price contract, BBC = buyback contract, RSC = revenue sharing contract.
aPooled data from managers and students in Phase 2 of the basic treatments.
bData of the uncensored treatment.
The contracts in Table 3.1 all have low sensitivities, such that deviating from the expected
profit-maximizing order quantity has a small effect on expected profit. Under service level
contracts, such low sensitivities can be avoided, which makes deviating from the expected profit-
maximizing order quantity more costly. The service level contracts used in our experiment
have sensitivities of up to 40% = 25.8% and 60% = 61.0%. Therefore, we expect lower
deviations from the optimal order quantity under a service level contract than under contracts
with low sensitivity. Proposition 3.1 states that for all wholesale price contracts, we can
design a service level contract with the same optimal order quantity but a steeper expected
profit function. We refer to such contracts as properly designed service level contracts and
state the hypotheses for the experiment as follows:
Hypothesis 3.1. Under a properly designed service level contract, average order quantities
are closer to the optimal order quantity than under a wholesale price contract.
From Proposition 3.3, we know that order variability is more costly under a properly designed
service level contract than under a wholesale price contract. We therefore hypothesize the
following:
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Hypothesis 3.2. Under a properly designed service level contract, orders are less variable
than under a wholesale price contract.
The expected behavior stated in Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 has an immediate consequence
for expected profits. The closer order quantities are to the optimal order quantity and the
less variability they exhibit, the higher is the expected supply chain profit. A standardized
measure of supply chain profit is supply chain efficiency, that is, the expected supply chain
profit achieved divided by the expected supply chain profit from the optimal order, and we
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3.3. Under a properly designed service level contract, expected supply chain
efficiency is higher than under a wholesale price contract.
The above hypotheses concern performance differences between service level contracts and
wholesale price contracts. For a given optimal order quantity, there exists a set of service
level contracts with different combinations of contract parameters (Figure 3.1). Although
these service level contracts have the same expected profit-maximizing order quantity, their
expected profit functions differ in steepness (Proposition 3.2) and concavity (Proposition 3.4).
We argued above that anchoring on mean demand and order variability are decreasing in the
steepness and concavity of the expected profit function. For a given optimal order quantity,
the steep service level contract has the steepest and the flat service level contract has the
flattest expected profit function, and we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3.4. Under a steep service level contract,
(a) average order quantities are closer to the optimal order quantity,
(b) order quantities are less variable, and
(c) supply chain efficiency is higher
than under a flat service level contract.
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Table 3.2 Treatments Used in Laboratory Experiment
Fixed payment Wholesale price Retail price Service level Penalty cost Optimal order Sensitivity
Treatment E w r s p q∗ 40% 60%
1. WPC – 3 12 – – 75 1.9% 4.2%
2. SLC75%, 145 225 6 12 75% 145 75 25.8% 61.0%
3. SLC100%, 12 264 6 12 100% 12 75 3.9% 8.4%
4. SLC75%, 6 205 6 12 75% 6 60 0.6% 1.3%
WPC = wholesale price contract, SLC = service level contract.
3.4 Experiment
We use a laboratory experiment to analyze human decision making under service level
contracts. Our experiment has four treatments, one wholesale price contract treatment, which
serves as a benchmark, and three service level contract treatments.
3.4.1 Design
Table 3.2 provides an overview of the four treatments of our laboratory experiment. All
treatments used discrete uniformly distributed demand between 1 and 100 and a retail price
of r = 12 francs. The fixed payments ensured that ordering the optimal quantities would
yield the same expected profit of 342 francs in all treatments. All payouts were expressed in
laboratory francs. Subjects were informed that francs would be converted into cash at an
exchange rate of 3,000 francs to the dollar at the end of the experiment.
We chose a high-profit condition such that inventory is optimally stocked above average
demand (q∗ > µ) because this setting offers greater possible gains from coordination, and
thus coordinating contracts, such as service level contracts, are more likely to be observed
in practice (Katok and Wu 2009, Wu and Chen 2014). Furthermore, service levels below
50% are uncommon in practice (Gruen et al. 2002). For the wholesale price contract of
Treatment 1, we used a wholesale price of w = 3 francs, resulting in an optimal order quantity
of q∗ = 75 units. The wholesale price of the service level contracts was w = 6 francs. In
Treatment 2, we used the steep service level contract, and in Treatment 3, we used the flat
service level contract (see Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.3 Experimental Protocol
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Treatments 1 to 3 are sufficient to test our hypotheses. The hypotheses are based on
arguments regarding differences in the steepnesses of the expected profit functions and do not
address the possibility that the service level exhibits an anchoring effect. To analyze whether
such an anchoring effect exists, we included Treatment 4, in which we used a service level
contract with the same service level as in Treatment 2 but with a lower unit penalty cost.
3.4.2 Protocol
All sessions were conducted at the Laboratory for Laboratory for Behavioral Operations
and Economics at the University of Texas at Dallas and followed the experimental protocol
in Figure 3.3. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007).
Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned to a private computer
terminal and given time to read the instructions. After they had read the instructions, subjects
could ask questions that were answered privately. During the experiment, communication
between subjects was prohibited and none was observed.
Before the actual experiment started, subjects completed a computerized quiz with 11
(wholesale price contract treatment) or 17 questions (service level contract treatments). The
quiz comprised three sections. In the first and second sections of the service level contract
treatments, subjects had to determine the purchase cost, the number of units sold, the revenue,
the service level, the number of units short of the target, the penalty cost, and the profit for
two examples that were identical across treatments. In the wholesale price contract treatment,
questions regarding the service level, the number of units short of the target, and the penalty
cost were excluded. The third section contained general questions about the experiment. The
questions and statistics on the answers are provided in Supplementary Material 3.C. If all
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questions of a section were answered correctly on the first attempt, subjects received 1,000
francs. If they needed a second attempt, they received 500 francs. If they needed more than
two attempts, they did not receive any compensation for the section. Subjects could continue
only after they had correctly answered all questions in a section. We used this approach to
ensure that subjects had a good understanding of the cost accounting and profit calculation
for the particular contract addressed in their treatment.
At the beginning of each period, subjects were reminded of all contract parameters. After
each period, they were shown a detailed breakdown of the profit calculation. After the main
experiment, all subjects completed two additional tasks (see Supplementary Material 3.D for
details). The first task was a computerized version of the risk elicitation task introduced by
Holt and Laury (2002). The second task was the computerized loss aversion measurement
task of Gächter et al. (2010), which was adapted from an earlier protocol of Fehr and Goette
(2007). Subjects earned francs depending on their decisions and the outcome of the risky
lotteries.
Finally, subjects answered some general questions, provided demographic data (see Supple-
mentary Material 3.E), and were paid, in private, their total individual earnings. The total
earnings were based on the performance on the quiz, the profits achieved over the 100 periods
of the main experiment, and the two lotteries that we used to elicit subjects’ risk and loss
aversion. The sessions lasted on average approximately 75 minutes. Actual average earnings,
including a $5 participation fee, were $17.24.
3.4.3 Subjects
A total of 116 subjects participated in six sessions of the experiment. In each session, subjects
were randomly assigned to one of the four treatments. Each subject participated in exactly
one session, and cash was the only incentive offered. Subjects were students recruited through
an online recruitment system from the subject pool of the University of Texas at Dallas. The
majority of our subjects were graduate students (81%), and the rest were undergraduates
(3% freshmen or sophomores and 16% juniors or seniors). The average age was 23.6 years
(SD = 2.0 years).
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Table 3.3 Summary Statistics
WPC SLC1 SLC2 SLC3
N = 30 N = 28 N = 30 N = 28
Subjects’ average order quantities
Normative 75 75 75 60
Mean 60.16 69.93 61.79 54.37
Median 60.59 70.31 60.65 53.76
Std. deviation 12.5 5.59 6.05 8.56
Within-subject standard deviation
Normative 0 0 0 0
Mean 15.51 8.99 13.88 16.18
Median 15.53 8.78 14.22 15.62
Std. deviation 7.33 4.51 5.72 5.47
Expected supply chain efficiency
Normative 100% 100% 100% 100%
Mean 88.15% 97.19% 92.19% 89.19%
Median 92.07% 98.05% 91.67% 89.57%
Std. deviation 13.42% 2.72% 3.82% 5.17%
WPC = wholesale price contract, SLC = service level contract.
3.5 Results
We will first test the hypotheses concerning the higher performance of service level contracts
compared to wholesale price contracts. Then, we will test the hypotheses concerning the
effect of the service level contract parameters on performance, and finally, we will analyze a
potential anchoring effect of the service level. Unless otherwise stated, we use the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test for one-sample tests and the Mann-Whitney test for two-sample tests. All
p -values we report below are two-tailed. Summary statistics are provided in Table 3.3. For all
comparisons below, we tested for differences in subjects’ risk (Holt and Laury 2002) and loss
aversion (Gächter et al. 2010) across treatments and could not find any significant differences
(all p > 0.1). Thus, there is no evidence that a difference in risk or loss aversion across
treatments drives our results.
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Figure 3.4 Average Order Quantities by Period Under Wholesale Price Contract and Service Level
Contracts
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3.5.1 Service Level Contracts Versus Wholesale Price Contract
Our first set of analyses compares performance under service level contracts with that under
a wholesale price contract. The hypotheses state that average order quantities are closer to
optimal quantities (Hypothesis 3.1), that they have lower variability (Hypothesis 3.2), and
that they result in higher supply chain efficiency (Hypothesis 3.3) under a properly designed
service level contract than under a wholesale price contract. We will first compare ordering
behavior under the wholesale price contract with that under the steep service level contract
of Treatment 2, which has a 40%-sensitivity that is over ten times that of the wholesale price
contract, and with that under the flat service level contract of Treatment 3, which has a
40%-sensitivity that is approximately twice that of the wholesale price contract.
3.5.1.1 Average Order Quantities
Figure 3.4 depicts the average order quantities per period under (a) the wholesale price
contract, (b) the steep service level contract, and (c) the flat service level contract. Under
the steep service level contract, average orders are closer to the optimal order quantity than
are those under the wholesale price contract. The average order quantities are 5.1 units
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below optimality under the service level contract versus 14.8 units under the wholesale price
contract. This difference is significant (p < 0.001), which provides support for Hypothesis 3.1.
Under the flat service level contract, average order quantities are slightly above the average
order quantities under the wholesale price contract, but we do not observe a similar magnitude
in the difference to that observed under the steep service level contract. Average order
quantities are 13.2 units versus 14.8 units below optimality for the flat service level contract
and the wholesale price contract, respectively. The difference is small (1.6 units) and not
significant (p = 0.965) and thus only provides directional support for Hypothesis 3.1.
3.5.1.2 Order Variability
From Table 3.3, we see that the within-subject standard deviation of order quantities under
the steep service level contract is 8.99 and lower than that under the wholesale price contract
(15.51). The difference in within-subject standard deviation is significant (t(56) = 4.04,
p < 0.001), providing support for Hypothesis 3.2.
Under the flat service level contract, we also observe less order variability than under
the wholesale price contract. However, the within-subject standard deviation difference is
small and not significant (t(58) = 0.96, p = 0.342), providing only directional support for
Hypothesis 3.2.
3.5.1.3 Supply Chain Efficiency
The above analysis shows that under properly designed service level contracts, average orders
are closer to the optimal quantities and have lower variability than under a wholesale price
contract, which should result in higher supply chain efficiency. To compute supply chain
efficiency, we must specify the production costs of the supplier. Without loss of generality, we
set them equal to the wholesale price in the wholesale price contract, that is, w = 3.
Under the steep service level contract, supply chain efficiency is 97.2% and significantly
higher than that under the wholesale price contract, 88.1% (p < 0.001), providing support for
Hypothesis 3.3. Under the flat service level contract, supply chain efficiency is 92.2% and
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also higher than that under the wholesale price contract, but the difference is not significant
(p = 0.399), again providing only directional support.
The results of our experiment provide directional support for Hypotheses 3.1, 3.2, and
3.3; that is, all experimental results are in the directions stated in these hypotheses. For the
steep service level contract, all differences are highly significant (p < 0.001 for all comparisons
between the steep service level contract and the wholesale price contract). For the flat service
level contract, the differences are not significant. We conclude that properly designed service
level contracts tend to outperform wholesale price contracts but that it is important to design
a supply contract with a steep expected profit function to realize the performance potential
that this contract type offers.
3.5.2 Steep Versus Flat Service Level Contract
The above analyses indicated that the steepness of the expected profit function affects ordering
behavior. Hypothesis 3.4 states the performance differences between steep and flat service
level contracts with respect to (a) average order quantities, (b) order variability, and (c)
supply chain efficiency, and we next formally test this hypothesis.
Average orders under the steep service level contract are significantly above those under
the flat service level contract (p < 0.001), which provides support for Hypothesis 3.4(a). From
Table 3.3, we see that a steeper expected profit function leads to less order variability among
service level contracts. The within-subject standard deviation is significantly lower under the
steep than under the flat service level contract (t(58) = 3.60, p < 0.001), providing support
for Hypothesis 3.4(b). We also find support for Hypothesis 3.4(c). The efficiency under the
steep service level contract is significantly higher than the efficiency under the flat service
level contract (p < 0.001).
3.5.3 Service Level Anchor
We can explain the superior performance of the steep service level contract compared with the
flat service level contract and the wholesale price contract by the steepnesses of the expected
profit functions. However, there exists another factor that can potentially affect behavior,
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that is, the stipulated service level. One might argue that a service level provides another
anchor in addition to mean demand and therefore affects order quantities.
If the service level served as an anchor, increasing the service level and maintaining the
optimal order quantity would increase average orders. The comparison of the steep service
level contract with service level 75% and the flat service level contract with service level 100%
shows that the service level contract with the higher service level has smaller average order
quantities. However, it has also a flatter expected profit function, and we cannot exclude the
possibility that we observed superposed effects: A flatter expected profit function reduces
order quantities, and a higher service level anchor increases them.
Ideally, we would design a service level contract with the same expected profit function and
optimal order quantity but with different service levels. Unfortunately, this is not possible.
When we vary the service level, we must change the unit penalty (see Figure 3.1) and thus
the expected profit function to maintain the same optimal order quantity. However, we can
use the results of Treatment 4 to obtain an indication of whether people anchor on the service
level.
In Treatment 4, we used the same service level of 75% as in Treatment 2 but used a unit
penalty cost of p = 6 instead of p = 145. The contract in Treatment 4 has a flatter expected
profit function than the steep service level contract from Treatment 2, and its optimal order
quantity is 15 units smaller (60 as opposed to 75 units).
If the service level served as an anchor, the difference in average orders should be smaller than
the difference in the optimal order quantity, but this is not the case. As Table 3.3 indicates,
average orders in Treatment 4 are 54.4 units, that is, 69.9 units−54.4 units = 15.5 units below
the average orders under the service level contract from Treatment 2. Because we held the
service level constant, this change must be attributed to the change in the expected profit
function. Because average orders differ by approximately the same quantity as the optimal
order quantities, we have another indication that the flatter expected profit function, and not
the service level anchor, explains behavior under service level contracts.
Figure 3.5 shows the average per period order quantities for Treatments 2 and 4. We
observe that they start at approximately the same level and then diverge over 30 rounds
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Figure 3.5 Average Order Quantities by Period in Treatments 2 and 4
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before they level out. Average order quantities in the first period of the treatments do
not significantly differ (average order quantities of 62.6 and 59.5 in Treatments 2 and 4,
respectively, p = 0.404). Fitting a simple trend line to the data from the first 30 periods of
Treatment 4, we find a significant order decrease of 0.361 units per period (standard error =
0.146, OLS two-tailed p = 0.019), which is significantly different from that of Treatment 2
(OLS two-tailed p = 0.029), in which we do not observe a significant trend over the fist 30
periods (OLS two-tailed p = 0.780). The results suggest that subjects might initially anchor
on the stipulated service level and then adjust toward their final decision over time.
We note that neither the comparison of Treatments 2 and 3 nor the comparison of Treatments
2 and 4 can exclude the possibility that a service level anchoring effect exists that is superposed
by the effect that steepness of the expected profit function has on ordering. However, they
indicate that if an anchoring effect existed, it diminished over time, and its effect size would
be much smaller than the size of the expected profit function steepness effect.
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Figure 3.6 Effect of Average Order Quantities and Order Variability on Efficiency
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3.6 Discussion and Managerial Implications
The majority of supply contracts analyzed in the literature have flat expected profit functions.
Under such contracts, moderate deviations from optimal order quantities are inexpensive, and
we have argued that this flatness contributes to the pull-to-center effect. We hypothesized
that a supply contract with a steep expected profit function can reduce the pull-to-center
effect, and our experimental results are in line with the prediction. Under the steep service
level contract, average order quantities were 6.8% below optimality, compared with 19.8%
under the wholesale price contract.
We argued that the steepness of the expected profit function also affects order variability
and hypothesized that order variability is lower under steep than under flat profit functions.
Our experimental results provided support for the hypothesis. Under the steep service level
contract, the standard deviation of order quantities was 8.99, compared with 15.51 under the
wholesale price contract.
Because better average order quantities and lower order variability result in higher efficiency,
we expected that efficiency would be higher under the steep service level contract than under
the wholesale price contract. Our experimental results were in line with this expectation.
The efficiency of the steep service level contract was 97.2%, compared with an efficiency of
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88.1% under the wholesale price contract. Figure 3.6 shows how the difference in efficiency
can be attributed to differences in mean order quantities and variabilities and indicates that
both factors play an important role in explaining the efficiency differences that we observed.
Figure 3.6 also shows the efficiency under a mean demand heuristic, whereby the expected
demand is ordered in every period. This heuristic can serve as a benchmark and contextualizes
the performance that we observed. The performance under the wholesale price contract was
even worse than that of the mean demand heuristic, albeit not significantly. Thus, ordering
mean demand in each period would result in a similar efficiency to what subjects achieved
in the lab under a wholesale price contract. In both settings, efficiency is over 11% below
optimality. Under a service level contract, the gap was reduced to less than 3%, which
indicates that it is important to consider aspects of human behavior when selecting supply
contracts.
In addition to incentivizing average order quantities that are close to optimal order quantities,
having low variability, and resulting in high efficiency, service level contracts have another
useful property. They can be parameterized to incentive first-best order quantities for any
desired expected profit division among suppliers and retailers. Other supply contracts with
two or more contract parameters have the same property, but unlike these contracts, service
level contracts can be parameterized to achieve three objectives simultaneously: incentivizing
first-best order quantities, offering a steep expected profit function, and dividing expected
profits arbitrarily among supply chain partners.
The service level parameters in our experiment were chosen to explore our steepness of
the curve hypothesis. The controlled environment of our study enables us to show that, in
principle, a service level contract can induce more optimal behavior than a mathematically
comparable wholesale price contract. An interesting next step is to explore whether the kinds
of parameterizations we observe in the field are sufficient to induce the same kind of favorable
results. A stake-size experiment of this sort is probably best conducted at the field level,
since emulating the size of field stakes, and the associated consequences to decision makers, is
difficult to do outside the field environment.
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3.7 Proofs
We present the proofs for continuous demand distributions and denote the wholesale price
under the wholesale price contract by wWP and under the service level contract by wSL.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. The optimal order quantity under a wholesale price contract with 0 < wWP < r is
q∗ = F −1 ( r−wWPr ). Consider a service level contract with wWP < wSL < r, 0 < s ≤ 1, and
p = wSL −wWP
1 − F ( q∗s ) , (3.7)
Because the second derivative of the expected profit function,
d2
dq2
ΠSL(s,wSL, q) = −wSLf(q) − (r −wSL)) f(q) − wSL −wWP
s (1 − F ( q∗s ))f( qs)
is negative, the expected profit function is concave in q and the retailer’s optimal order
quantity can be determined by solving
d
dq
ΠSL(s,wSL, q) = −wSLF (q) + (r −wSL) (1 − F (q)) + wSL −wWP
1 − F ( q∗s ) (1 − F ( qs)) = 0 (3.8)
for q. With q = q∗ in Equation (3.8), we obtain
d
dq
ΠSL(s,wSL, q)∣
q=q∗ = −wSL r −wWPr + (r −wSL) (1 − r −wWPr ) +wSL −wWP = 0,
which proves that a service level contract with unit penalty cost chosen according to Equa-
tion (3.7) has the same optimal solution as the wholesale price contract.
We next prove that the expected profit function of the service level contract is steeper than
80
Chapter 3 Decision Making Under Service Level Contracts: An Experimental Analysis
that of the wholesale price contract. For q < q∗,
d
dq
ΠSL(s,wSL, q) = r (1 − F (q)) −wSL ⎛⎝1 − 1 − F ( qs)1 − F ( q∗s )
⎞⎠ −wWP ⎛⎝ 1 − F ( qs)1 − F ( q∗s )
⎞⎠
> r (1 − F (q)) −wWP ⎛⎝1 − 1 − F ( qs)1 − F ( q∗s )
⎞⎠ −wWP ⎛⎝ 1 − F ( qs)1 − F ( q∗s )
⎞⎠
= d
dq
ΠWP (wWP , q).
Analogously, it can be shown for q > q∗ that ddqΠSL(s,wSL, q) < ddqΠWP (wWP , q).
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. Consider a service level contract with wWP < wSL < r, 0 < s ≤ 1, and p chosen
according to Equation (3.7). The expected profit function has steepness ddqΠSL(s,wSL, q) =−wSLF (q)+(r −wSL) (1 − F (q))+ wSL−wWP
1−F ( q∗s ) (1 − F ( qs)). To determine the effect of the service
level s on the steepness, we analyze the first derivative of steepness with respect to service
level:
d
ds
d
dq
ΠSL(s,wSL, q) = (wSL −wWP )f( qs) qs2 (1 − F( q∗s )) − (1 − F ( qs))f( q∗s ) q∗s2(1 − F ( q∗s ))2
= (wSL −wWP ) 1 − F ( qs)(1 − F( q∗s )) s
⎛⎝qs f( qs)1 − F ( qs) − q
∗
s
f( q∗s )
1 − F( q∗s )⎞⎠ . (3.9)
Let h(x) ≡ f(x)/ (1 − F (x)) denote the failure rate. All logconcave distributions have an
increasing failure rate (Bagnoli and Bergstrom 2005). From Lariviere and Porteus (2001) we
know that distributions with an increasing failure rate have an increasing generalized failure
rate, that is, xh(x) is increasing x. Therefore qsf( qs)/ (1 − F ( qs)) is increasing in q and it
follows that Equation (3.9) is negative for q < q∗ and positive for q > q∗.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. Consider a service level contract with wWP < wSL < r, 0 < s ≤ 1, and p chosen according
to Equation (3.7). To prove the proposition, we show that the expected profit function of the
81
Chapter 3 Decision Making Under Service Level Contracts: An Experimental Analysis
service level contract is more concave than the expected profit function of the wholesale price
contract:
d2
dq2
ΠSL(s,wSL, q) = −wSLf(q) − (r −wSL) f(q) − wSL −wWP
1 − F ( q∗s )
f( qs)
s
= −rf(q) − wSL −wWP
1 − F ( q∗s )
f( qs)
s
< −rf(q) = d2
dq2
ΠWP (wWP , q).
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. Consider a service level contract with wWP < wSL < r, 0 < s ≤ 1, and p chosen according
to Equation (3.7). We show that the concavity of the expected profit function is decreasing in
s, that is, that the second derivative of the expected profit function with respect to q becomes
less negative as s increases. We next provide the proof for q = q∗ and then show that the
result also holds for q < q∗. The concavity of expected profit function at q = q∗ is
d2
dq2
ΠSL(s,wSL, q)∣
q=q∗ = −rf(q∗) − (wSL −wWP ) 1q∗ q∗s f( q
∗
s )
1 − F( q∗s ) . (3.10)
The concavity of the expected profit (Equation (3.10)) is increasing in s if q
∗
s
f( q∗s )
1−F( q∗s ) = q∗s h( q∗s )
is decreasing in s. q
∗
s h( q∗s ) is a generalized failure rate with a logconcave density function,
which is decreasing in s. Thus, the right term in Equation (3.10) is decreasing in s, implying
that concavity is decreasing as s increases, that is, dds
d2
dq2 ΠSL(s,wSL, q)∣q=q∗ > 0.
To prove that the proposition also holds for q < q∗, we consider the first derivative of the
concavity with respect to s:
d
ds
d2
dq2
ΠSL(s,wSL, q) = −(wSL −wWP )−q (1 − F ( q∗s )) f ′( qs) + f( qs) (−s + sF ( q∗s ) − q∗f( q∗s ))
s3 (−1 + F ( q∗s ))2= (wSL −wWP ) f( qs)
s3 (1 − F( q∗s ))q (h(q
∗
s
) q∗
q
+ s
q
+ f ′( qs)
f( qs) ) (3.11)
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We proved above that this derivative is positive for q = q∗, which implies that
h(q∗
s
) + s
q∗ + f ′( q
∗
s
)
f( q∗s ) > 0
Logconcavity of the density function f implies that f
′( q
s
)
f( q
s
) is decreasing in q. Thus for q < q∗,
the last term in Equation (3.11) is positive and the proposition also holds for q < q∗.
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3.A Sample Instructions
The sample instructions below are for the wholesale price (Treatment 1) and the service
level contract with s = 75 and p = 145 (Treatment 2). Instructions for the other service level
contracts (Treatments 3 and 4) considered in our study are presented analogously but with
different parameters.
At the end of the experiment, we asked our subjects to rate, on a 7-point Likert scale
(from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”), how much they agree or disagree with the
statement “The instructions were clear and precise” (see 3.E). A Kruskal-Wallis H test showed
that there was no statistically significant difference in the rating across our four treatments,
χ2(3) = 2.845, p = 0.416, with a mean rank of 6.0, 5.8, 5.4, and 5.3 for Treatments 1, 2, 3, and
4, re spectively.
Instructions for the Wholesale Price Contract
The purpose of today’s session is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation.
If you follow these instructions carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable
amount of money. If you have any questions, feel free to raise your hand and the experimenter
will come to you and answer your question.
During this session, you will play a game from which you can earn money. Your earnings
in this session are expressed in ‘francs’ with the following exchange rate:
3,000 francs = $1
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Description of the game
You are a retailer who sells a single generic product. In each period of the game, you will
order the product from an external supplier at a purchase price of 3 francs per unit and sell
the product to customers at a sales price of 12 francs per unit.
You play 100 periods with identical activities:
∎ At the beginning of each period, you determine the order quantity before you know what
your customers will demand. You can choose your order quantity freely between 0 and
100.
∎ Once you have submitted your order, the computer generates a customer demand.
To generate a customer demand, the computer draws a random number between 1 and
100. All customer demands between 1 and 100 are equally likely. The demand drawn for
any one period is independent of the demand from earlier periods. So a small or large
demand in earlier periods has no influence on whether demand is small or large in later
periods.
∎ Demand is filled and your profit is computed. There are two different cases:
– If customer demand is less than or equal to your order quantity, all customer demand
can be filled. Your profit is:
Profit = 12 ⋅Customer Demand − 3 ⋅Order Quantity
– If customer demand is greater than your order quantity, only customer demand up to
the order quantity can be filled. Your profit is:
Profit = 12 ⋅Order Quantity − 3 ⋅Order Quantity
∎ If your order quantity was greater than the demand, the remaining stock is disposed of at
no cost at the end of the period. In other words, remaining inventory is worthless and is
not carried over to later periods.
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Profit calculation per period
Your profit in each period is:
Profit = Sales Price ⋅ Customer Demand Filled (Revenue )
− Purchase Price ⋅ Order Quantity (Order Cost )
Please be aware that you can also make a loss. Should you have accumulated losses after the
100 periods, these will be set against your show-up fee of $5.
Example
Suppose customer demand is 60 units and you ordered 80 units:
All customer demand can be filled, and your profit in this period is:
Profit = 12 ⋅ 60 − 3 ⋅ 80 = 480
Now, suppose customer demand is 60 units and you ordered 40 units:
Only 40 units can be filled, and your profit in this period is:
Profit = 12 ⋅ 40 − 3 ⋅ 40 = 360
Sequence of the experiment
Comprehension
questions 2 short tasks Questionnaire Payment 100 periods of the game
Payment determination
At the end of the session, your total earnings will be converted into U.S. dollars at a rate of
$1 per 3,000 francs, added to your show-up fee of $5, and paid to you in cash.
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Instructions for the Service Level Contract
The purpose of today’s session is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation.
If you follow these instructions carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable
amount of money. If you have any questions, feel free to raise your hand and the experimenter
will come to you and answer your question.
During this session, you will play a game from which you can earn money. Your earnings
in this session are expressed in ‘francs’ with the following exchange rate:
3,000 francs = $1
Description of the game
You are a retailer who sells a single generic product. In each period of the game, you will
order the product from an external supplier at a purchase price of 6 francs per unit and sell
the product to customers at a sales price of 12 francs per unit.
You play 100 periods with identical activities:
∎ At the beginning of each period, you receive a fixed endowment of 225 francs.
∎ You determine the order quantity before you know what your customers will demand.
You can choose your order quantity freely between 0 and 100.
∎ Once you have submitted your order, the computer generates a customer demand.
To generate a customer demand, the computer draws a random number between 1 and
100. All customer demands between 1 and 100 are equally likely. The demand drawn for
any one period is independent of the demand from earlier periods. So a small or large
demand in earlier periods has no influence on whether demand is small or large in later
periods.
∎ Demand is filled and your fill rate is calculated. There are two different cases:
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– If customer demand is less than or equal to your order quantity, all customer demand
can be filled. The fill rate is:
Fill Rate = Customer Demand Filled
Customer Demand
= Customer Demand
Customer Demand
= 100%
– If customer demand is greater than your order quantity, only customer demand up to
the order quantity can be filled. The fill rate is:
Fill Rate = Customer Demand Filled
Order Quantity
= Order Quantity
Customer Demand
< 100%
∎ The fill rate target is 75%; that is, the target is filling at least 75% of actual period
demand. An amount of 145 francs is deducted for each unit you fall short of target.
∎ If your order quantity was greater than the demand, the remaining stock is disposed of at
no cost at the end of the period. In other words, remaining inventory is worthless and is
not carried over to later periods.
Profit calculation per period
Your profit in each period is:
Profit = Endowment
+ Sales Price ⋅ Customer Demand Filled (Revenue )
− Purchase Price ⋅ Order Quantity (Order Cost )
− Deduction ⋅ Units Short of Target (Deduction )
Please be aware that you can also make a loss. Should you have accumulated losses after the
100 periods, these will be set against your show-up fee of $5.
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Example
Suppose customer demand is 60 units and you ordered 80 units:
All customer demand can be filled, and your fill rate = 60/60 = 100%. Because your fill rate
is above 75%, you do not incur a deduction. Your profit in this period is:
Profit = 225 + 12 ⋅ 60 − 6 ⋅ 80 = 465
Now, suppose customer demand is 60 units and you ordered 40 units:
Only 40 units can be filled, and your fill rate = 40/60 = 66.7%. 45 units, 5 units more, would
have been required to achieve a fill rate of 75%. You incur a deduction of 145 francs for each
of the 5 units you are short of target. Your profit in this period is:
Profit = 225 + 12 ⋅ 40 − 6 ⋅ 40 − 145 ⋅ 5 = −260
Sequence of the experiment
Comprehension
questions 2 short tasks Questionnaire Payment 100 periods of the game
Payment determination
At the end of the session, your total earnings will be converted into U.S. dollars at a rate of
$1 per 3,000 francs, added to your show-up fee of $5, and paid to you in cash.
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3.B Decision and Result Screens
Decision Screen
Result Screen
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3.C Comprehension Questions
In this section, we provide the questions and answers from the computerized quiz that our
subjects had to pass before they could continue with the main part of the experiment. The
sample quiz below contains the questions and answers for the service level contract with
s = 75 and p = 145. Note that the correct answers are indicated with dots (⊙). The questions
from the other treatments in our study are presented analogously, except for the differences
outlined in Section 3.4.2.
Section 1
Suppose you ordered 60 units and the computer generated a customer demand of 90 units.
(1) What are your Order Costs in this period?⊙ 360 francs
# 540 francs
# 720 francs
(2) How many units can you sell in this period?
# 30⊙ 60
# 90
(3) What is your Revenue in this period?
# 360 francs⊙ 720 francs
# 1080 francs
(4) What is your Fill Rate in this period?
# 33.3%⊙ 66.7%
# 100%
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(5) How many units more (if any) would have been required to achieve a fill rate of 75%?
# 0⊙ 8
# 30
(6) What is your Deduction in this period?
# 0 francs⊙ 1160 francs
# 4350 francs
(7) What is your Profit in this period? (Note that your endowment is 225 francs.)⊙ -575 francs
# -215 francs
# 585 francs
Section 2
Suppose you ordered 60 units and the computer generated a customer demand of 30 units.
(1) What are your Order Costs in this period?
# 180 francs⊙ 360 francs
# 720 francs
(2) How many units can you sell in this period?⊙ 30
# 60
# 90
(3) What is your Revenue in this period?
# 180 francs⊙ 360 francs
# 720 francs
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(4) What is your Fill Rate in this period?
# 33.3%
# 66.7%⊙ 100%
(5) How many units more (if any) would have been required to achieve a fill rate of 75%?⊙ 0
# 8
# 30
(6) What is your Deduction in this period?⊙ 0 francs
# 1160 francs
# 4350 francs
(7) What is your Profit in this period? (Note that your endowment is 225 francs.)
# -135 francs⊙ 225 francs
# 585 francs
Section 3
(1) All 100 periods are payoff relevant.⊙ True
# False
(2) You can choose your order quantity freely between 0 and 100.⊙ True
# False
(3) Depending on your order quantity and customer demand, you can also make losses.⊙ True
# False
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Figure 3.7 Proportion of Required Attempts to Pass a Section of the Quiz by Treatment
SLC75%, 6
35.7%
SLC100%, 12
26.7%
WPC
50.0%
13.3%
SLC75%, 145
10.0%
17.9%
3.6%
6.7%
Section 1 Section 2
0.0%
3.3%
10.0%
7.1%
Section 3
21 >2
Number of attempts
Figure 3.7 shows the proportion of subjects who required one, two, or more attempts to
pass a specific section of the quiz. Comparing the average number of attempts within a section
across our four treatments, we did not find any significant differences, except for the first
section, in which subjects in the SLC75%,145 treatment required on average 1.9 more attempts
to correctly answer all questions than did subjects in the WPC treatment (p = 0.017). This is
not surprising because the first section of the WPC treatment had three fewer questions and
required less calculation effort.
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3.D Additional Tasks
Task 1 – Holt and Laury’s (2002) Risk Elicitation Task
Task 2 – Gächter et al.’s (2010) Lottery Choice Task to Assess Loss Aversion
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3.E Post-Experimental Questionnaire
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Chapter 4
Trusting the Forecast: The Role of Numeracy
Relying on a scientific forecast to make decisions is an act of trust. Conventionally, forecast
guidance that includes uncertainty measures is generally thought to be for quantitatively
sophisticated decision makers, while firmer forecast guidance that omits uncertainty measures
is more easily and generally understood. In a controlled study of decision making in a simple
take-the-risk or take-the-cost decision game, we examine compliance rates (trust) for forecast
guidance provided as probabilities as well as recommendations. Most strikingly, and contrary
to our initial expectation, low numerate subjects exhibit less trust in recommendation forecasts
than do high numerates. While we find a positive relationship between subjects’ numeracy
and trust in probability forecasts, this relationship is overshadowed by the fact that even high
numerate subjects use the probabilities inefficiently. Forecast guidance that blends probabilities
and recommendations, in a way designed to offset the major behavioral shortcomings we
observe, improves compliance; especially for high numerates. We argue that improving low
numerate individuals’ trust in forecasting will require a new approach.
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4.1 Introduction
Many important business and personal decisions have to be made under risk and uncertainty.
Typically, experts use scientific models to derive forecasts, while non-expert users employ
these forecasts to make the decisions. With the growing availability of big data and predictive
analytics, more and more decisions are guided by expert models, ranging from improving
emergency responsiveness (Green and Kolesar 2004, Pinker 2007), to supply base diversification,
to talent management (Arellano et al. 2017). The forecasts for these specific applications are
inherently uncertain. For the forecast users, the value of scientific forecasts rests largely with
a reduction of uncertainty over future events, thereby enabling better decision making today
(Weber 1994, Fox and Tversky 1998).
Definitions of trust vary but one commonly accepted definition across multiple disciplines
is that “trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based
upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al. 1998,
p. 395). For most people, relying on an expert forecast for decision guidance is an act of
trust (Burgman 2016). Forecasts are by nature uncertain, and most forecast users have
only a partial understanding of the workings and expected accuracy of the scientific models
that underlie the forecast. To the extent that forecast users misunderstand the underlying
uncertainty, or fail to use this information properly, they are vulnerable to decision mistakes
that, rightly or wrongly, may get attributed to a faulty forecast.
Diversity in user numeracy complicates forecast guidance on forecast uncertainty, a clear
measure of which is, in decision theory, critical to good decision making. Forecast uncertainty
is difficult to convey effectively in words because different people interpret words like ‘likely’
differently (Bryant and Norman 1980, Beyth-Marom 1982, Wallsten 1986, Karelitz and
Budescu 2004). Conventionally, forecast guidance that includes quantitative measures of
uncertainty is thought to be for numerically sophisticated decision makers, while firmer forecast
guidance that omits uncertainty measures, such as point forecasts or recommendations of
what decision to take, is more easily and generally understood. Regarding trust there is a
potential trade-off here: The measure of uncertainty is, in decision theory, sufficient to make
optimal decisions but may also be prone to misunderstanding or misuse particularly among
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numerically less sophisticated users (Schwartz et al. 1997). Firmer guidance that omits or
de-emphasizes uncertainty – point forecasts or recommendations for example – is easier to
incorporate into decision making (assuming users deem the information credible) but may
also raise questions of reliability as users observe forecast errors (Bliss et al. 1995, Meyer and
Bitan 2002).
Here, we examine this trade-off in the context of a cost-loss game, in which a decision
maker chooses whether to take the risk of a loss or take a cost to avoid the risk (Bilham
1922, Thompson 1952). Many of the important risk decisions people face have a cost-loss
structure. Examples include whether to evacuate in the face of an impending hurricane, how
to invest for retirement, whether to elect a preventative medical procedure, and how to vote
on climate change policies. For each of these examples a forecast is typically available to aid
in the decision.
Making an informed decision in a cost-loss situation requires an evaluation of how likely it is
that the loss occurs. Providing the relevant probabilities is a straightforward way of conveying
this information to the forecast-users. Behavioral studies of cost-loss games find that providing
numerical forecast information of risk can improve the quality of decisions relative to providing
a point forecast only (Roulston et al. 2006). Work on categorical recommendations find a cry
wolf effect when the recommendation turns out to be a false alarm (Meyer and Bitan 2002,
Roulston and Smith 2004, Bolton and Katok 2017). However, it is likely that providing the
relevant probabilities is only meaningful to the extent that people have the ability to process
basic probability and numerical concepts, a construct called numeracy (Schwartz et al. 1997).
People differ substantially in their numeracy skills, and many people are innumerate
(Schwartz et al. 1997, Lipkus et al. 2001, Cokely et al. 2012). The 2003 National Assessment
of Adult Literacy indicates that about half the U.S. population has only very basic or below
basic numeracy skills (Kutner et al. 2006). The Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) shows that
in almost all OECD countries a sizable proportion of adults has poor numeracy skills, 23% of
adults, on average (OECD 2016). The survey also reveals that across countries and economies,
there is a positive correlation between numeracy skills and trust. While the causal nature of
this relationship is difficult to discern, it clearly matters, because trust is the foundation of
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economic behavior. Gurmankin et al. (2004) revealed that trust in numerical information
increases in numeracy skills. They hypothesize that low numerate individuals will be more
likely than their high numerate peers to reject information that they perceive to be inaccurate
or unreliable. Furthermore, low numerate individuals are less likely to retrieve and use
appropriate numerical principles, are less likely to use accuracy-enhancing System 2 forms
of thinking, and are more vulnerable to System 1 cognitive errors (Kahneman 2003, Peters
et al. 2006, 2007). Peters et al. (2007) found that this effect of numeracy is not due to general
intelligence.
In some conditions of our experiment, forecasts are offered in the form probabilities of the
loss event, a form of forecast that emphasizes the inherent uncertainty in the underlying
model. In other conditions, the forecast is offered as a recommendation of whether to take the
cost or take the risk, a form of forecast that provides the optimal action given the expected
probability of loss while de-emphasizing the underlying model uncertainty. Both kinds of
forecasts are common. We measured numeracy in each condition, to learn more about the
role of numerical abilities and its interaction with the form of forecast. Numeracy is deemed
important because it affects risk comprehension and the efficiency of decision making (Reyna
et al. 2009). The hypothesis we test in this study is that people with higher numeracy skills
are better able to utilize probability information, while lower numeracy people perform better
with recommendation.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we present the details of our experimental
design, protocol, and sample. In Section 4.3, we present the results of our study, starting with
aggregate descriptive statistics, the role-of-numeracy analysis, and following with analyses of
the behavioral strength and weaknesses of probabilities and recommendations. In Section 4.3,
we also present forecast guidance that blends probabilities and recommendations in a way
designed to offset the major behavioral shortcomings. In Sections 4.4, we summarize our
conclusions and discuss the managerial implications of our findings.
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Figure 4.1 The Cost-Loss Game
Take the risk Take the cost
-100 tokens 0 tokens
-75 tokensP 100% – P 
4.2 Experiment
4.2.1 Design
4.2.1.1 Forecast guidance in a cost-loss game
Figure 4.1 depicts the extensive form of the cost-loss game used in the experiment. The
decision maker chooses between two actions: take the risk, in which case she loses 100 tokens
with probability P or take the cost, in which case she loses 75 tokens for certain.
Each subject in the experiment played this game 100 times, with the value of P varying
each round. The expected cost minimizing decision depends on P ; specifically, the implied
choice rule is take the risk if the expected loss, P × 100, is less than 75, and take the cost if
greater than 75. Given the monetary stakes and the amount of game repetition, this rule
should approximate the optimal decision rule for all but highly risk averse individuals.1 We
use this rule to benchmark forecast compliance; that is, we say that a decision is forecast
compliant if it is optimal given the forecast information about P available to the decision
maker.
The experiment manipulates the forecast information decision makers have about probability
P and compare the optimality of subject decision making across manipulations. At the
beginning of all conditions, subjects are told that the probability of the loss event will average
to 50% over the series of cost-loss games they play. In the baseline Neither condition, this is
1The major conclusions we will draw are robust to the assumption that players are risk averse; see Bolton and
Katok (2017).
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all the information subjects are given. The optimal action in each round is to take the risk.
In the other conditions, subjects also receive round-by-round forecast guidance.
In the Probability condition, forecast guidance is communicated as the actual value of P
for that round. In the Recommendation condition, guidance takes the form of advice: “take
the risk” or “take the cost” (the value of P is not provided). The recommendation follows
the optimal decision rule. The Both condition, both probability and recommendation are
presented together. For all three of these conditions, the optimal decision rule stipulates
taking the risk if P < 75%; take the cost otherwise. The round-by-round forecasts provide
better information about the risk than does knowing only the average cross-rounds probability,
so decision makers with round-by-round forecasts should experience fewer total losses (costs
paid plus losses incurred from risks) than users in the Neither condition.
Because it is optimal when no day-to-day forecast guidance is available, take the risk is
the status quo action. In this context, the function of the day-to-day forecast is to alert the
decision maker that the status quo action should be abandoned in favor of taking the cost,
the siren action.
4.2.1.2 Assessment of Numeracy
We assessed a subject’s numeracy with seven questions and scored it as the total number of
correct responses. Table 4.1 shows the numeracy questions accompanied by the percentage of
subjects who responded correctly to each item.
Item 1 to 3 are taken from Schwartz et al. (1997) and the remaining items are taken
from the Berlin Numeracy Test by Cokely et al. (2012). Building on the work of Lipkus
et al. (2001) and Schwartz et al. (1997), Cokely et al. (2012) provide a relatively short and
reliable instrument that has been proven to be the strongest single predictor of individual
differences in understanding everyday risks, such as evaluating risk in numerical and non-
numerical claims about consumer products and medical treatments or interpreting weather
forecasts (Ghazal et al. 2014). The Berlin Numeracy Test was developed to assess numeracy
of educated and highly educated samples, such as college students. Cokely et al. (2012)
suggests to combine the Berlin Numeracy Test with the Schwartz et al. test when assessing
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Table 4.1 Numeracy Questions Accompanied by the Percentage of Subjects Who Responded Correctly
to Each Item
Item % Correct
1. Imagine that we flip a fair coin 1,000 times. What is your best guess about how many times the coin
would come up heads in 1,000 flips?
87.1
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chance of winning a $10 prize is 1%. What is your best guess
about how many people would win a $10 prize if 1,000 people each buy a single ticket to BIG
BUCKS?
81.1
3. In ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What percent of
tickets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?
56.2
4. Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of these 50 throws how many
times would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3, or 5)?
56.2
5. Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides). The probability that the die shows a 6 is twice as
high as the probability of each of the other numbers. On average, out of these 70 throws how many
times would the die show the number 6?
38.8
6. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these 500 members in a
choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in a choir 300 are men. What is the
probability that a randomly drawn man is a member of the choir?
37.8
7. In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown and 30% white. A red mushroom is poisonous
with a probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red is poisonous with a probability of 5%. What
is the probability that a poisonous mushroom in the forest is red?
16.4
individuals who have lower levels of educational attainment. They tested the combined
score on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online labor market and showed that it provides a fast
assessment with excellent discriminability. We added two additional items to specifically test
subjects’ comprehension of expected values, such as “Imagine we toss a fair coin. If head
comes up you win $20, if tail comes up you win $100. What is the expected payoff of this
gamble?” We find a strong positive correlation between the combined score suggested by
Cokely et al. (2012) and the number of correct answers to our additional items (r = 0.552,
p < 0.001).
All questions were incentivized such that subjects earned ten cents for each question
answered correctly.
4.2.2 Protocol
The experiment was conducted online using a self-developed Javascript software (implemented
in Qualtrics). Upon accessing the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to one of
our four conditions, and this assignment remained constant throughout all rounds for each
subject. The forecast information given to the subject (Neither, Probability, Recommendation,
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or Both) depended on the condition and subjects were shown the corresponding on-screen
instructions (Supplementary Material 4.A) at the beginning of the experiment.
After reading the instructions but before playing the cost-loss game, subjects had to pass a
comprehension quiz that was the same for all conditions. The quiz comprised five questions
provided in Supplementary Material 4.B. Subjects could continue only after they had correctly
answered all questions on the first attempt (approximately one third were screened out). We
used this approach to ensure that subjects have read and understood the instructions.
At the beginning of each of the 100 rounds of play, a subject receives an endowment of
150 tokens (to avoid “bankruptcy problems” in which subjects would owe the experimenter
money; the endowment is fixed and does not change the normative analysis of the optimal
action). Forecast information depending on the condition was made available to subjects
before they made their decisions of whether to take the risk or take the cost. A random draw
from a uniform distribution, consistent with the loss probability P for that round, determined
the outcome of whether the loss occurred. Draws were independent across rounds, subjects,
and conditions. After the decision, the outcome and payoff was displayed to the subjects (see
screen shots of the computer interface in Supplementary Material 4.C).
After the main part of the experiment, we asked all subjects to “briefly describe how [they]
have decided when to take the risk and when to take the cost”. Subjects then answered the
seven numeracy questions (Table 4.1) as well as our two additional items, and completed a
risk elicitation task. We decided to use the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) introduced by
Crosetto and Filippin (2013) to asses subjects’ risk preferences, because it requires minimal
numeracy skills but still allows precise estimation of both risk aversion and risk seeking. The
BRET asks subjects to choose the number of boxes they want to collect from a set of 100
boxes, one of which contains a bomb. Earnings increase with the number of boxes collected
(ten cents per box) but are equal to zero if one of them contains the bomb. Thus, the number
of boxes collected is a good proxy for subjects’ risk appetite (for instructions and results see
Supplementary Material 4.D).
At the conclusion of the experiment we asked subjects for additional demographic informa-
tion, including age, gender, highest level of education completed, employment status, and
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Table 4.2 Sample Demographics (N = 201)
Demographics Percentage
Agea 35.0 (10.9)
Gender (female) 54.7
Highest level of education
High school graduate 16.9
Some college 29.4
Bachelor’s degree 38.8
Master’s degree 12.4
Doctoral or advanced professional degree 2.5
Employment status
Not working 19.4
Working (paid employee) 62.2
Working (self-employed) 18.4
Annual income from all sources before taxes
$20,000 and under 28.9
$20,001 to $40,000 33.8
$40,001 to $60,000 21.9
$60,001 to $80,000 9.5
Over $80,000 6.0
Note. aM (SD)
own annual income from all sources before taxes (see post-experimental questionnaire in
Supplementary Material 4.E).
4.2.3 Subjects
We recruited subjects on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online labor market (Buhrmester
et al. 2011, Paolacci and Chandler 2014). We restricted participation to residents of the
United States. After accepting to participate in our study, subjects were referred to an
external website containing our online experiment. A total of 361 MTurk workers started our
survey and were randomly assigned to one of our four conditions. Out of this 361 workers, 110
were screened out in the quiz and 50 did not complete the survey, resulting in a sample size of
201 subjects (demographic features of the sample are summarized in Table 4.2). There were
no statistically significant differences neither for the failure rates in the quiz (χ2(3) = 1.287,
p = 0.732) nor for the drop-out rates (χ2(3) = 3.187, p = 0.364) across conditions. Selective
attrition is therefore not an important concern for our study.
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Table 4.3 Summary of the Experimental Conditions
Probability
Not provided Provided
Recommendation
Not provided Neither Probability(n = 50) (n = 60)
Provided Recommendation Both(n = 47) (n = 44)
Subjects required on average 31 minutes to complete the experiment. Actual average
earnings, including a $1 participation fee, were $6.64, resulting in an average wage of more
than $13 per hour, which are substantial earnings on MTurk. Table 4.3 summarizes the
condition labels and sample sizes.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Overall Results
We begin by plotting the proportion of decisions to take the risk over time in Figure 4.2.
Fitting a simple trend line to the data in Figure 4.2 (where each data point corresponds to
the proportion of subjects who take the risk per round), we find a significant trend only if the
advice is to take the cost for the Probability (Figure 4.2(b)) and the Both (Figure 4.2(d))
condition (random effects regression, two-tailed p < 0.05 in both cases). If the optimal action
is to take the cost in the Probability condition the overall average increase in compliance is
0.04 percentage points per round (standard error = 0.016); if the optimal action is to take
the cost in the Both condition, the overall average increase in compliance is 0.10 percentage
points per round (standard error = 0.021).
Overall, we can conclude that there is little to no trend in our data (see Figure 4.5).
Therefore, to further investigate how different information affects behavior we plot the average
compliance across all rounds and subjects by condition, and broken out on whether the
optimal action was to take the risk or take the cost in Figure 4.3. On the right side, the figure
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Figure 4.2 Proportion of Subjects Who Take the Risk
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also presents pairwise Wilcoxon rank-sum tests that compare forecast compliance for each
pair of conditions in our study.
Absent of forecast information, subjects take the risk with a frequency of 66%. Getting
a probability forecast that implies that taking the risk is optimal does not increase this
frequency. Receiving a recommendation to take the risk significantly increases this frequency
to 85%. Comparing the compliance in the Probability and Recommendation condition, we
can conclude that the latter lead to higher compliance if the forecast implies to take the risk.
The frequency of taking the cost, absent of forecast guidance, is 33%. Both probability and
recommendation forecasts significantly improve this frequency to 93% and 65%, respectively.
A direct comparison of these frequencies shows that, if the forecast implies to take the cost, the
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Figure 4.3 Mean Proportion of Time in Compliance With the Forecast by Treatment
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests
(two-tailed, n = number of subjects)
Comparison p -values
P < 75%
H0: Neither = Probability 0.417
H0: Neither = Recommendation 0.015
H0: Neither = Both 0.721
H0: Probability = Recommendation 0.000
H0: Probability = Both 0.040
H0: Recommendation = Both 0.000
P ≥ 75%
H0: Neither = Probability 0.000
H0: Neither = Recommendation 0.000
H0: Neither = Both 0.000
H0: Probability = Recommendation 0.000
H0: Probability = Both 0.244
H0: Recommendation = Both 0.000
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Note. Error bars indicate one standard error.
probability forecast is now more effective to increase compliance than is the recommendation
forecast.
Giving subjects both probability and recommendation forecasts leads to similar compliance
as probability only forecasts. We do not find a difference between Probability and Both
treatment in their effectiveness to induce compliance with the siren action (take the cost).
Adding verbal recommendation to the probability forecast, however, helps to improve forecast
compliance (from 66% to 74%) if the forecast implies to take the risk; but still remains behind
the compliance of 85% in the Recommendation condition. Overall, we can conclude that the
results from Bolton and Katok (2017) replicate quite well qualitatively on MTurk.
4.3.2 The Role of Numeracy
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of the numeracy scores in our sample. The mean numeracy
score is 3.74 (SD = 1.84). A Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality indicates that we cannot
reject that numeracy is normally distributed in our sample (p = 0.100), with skewness of
0.13. There was no statistically significant difference between conditions (F (3,197) = 1.78,
p = 0.153).
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Figure 4.4 Distribution of Numeracy Scores
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To get a sense of the role of numeracy, Figure 4.5 displays the proportion of decisions to
take the risk by loss probability P (averaged over 5-percentage-point blocks). We partitioned
subjects into low numerate (numeracy score 3 and below) and high numerate (numeracy score
4 and above) subjects.
Absent round-by-round forecast information, high numerate subjects seem to be somewhat
more likely to take the optimal action (take the risk) than low numerate subjects (on average
70% versus 62%). If a probability forecast is provided, Figure 4.5(b), high numerate subjects
are somewhat more likely to take the optimal action when the forecast implies to take the risk
(69% versus 63%). When the forecast implies to take the cost there is no difference in the
proportion of subjects who take the cost (93%) between high and low numerate subjects. In
the Recommendation condition, Figure 4.5(c), high numerate subjects are again more likely
to take the optimal action when the forecast implies to take the risk (94% versus 71%). When
the forecast implies to take the cost, high numerate subjects are only slightly more likely to
follow the forecast than low numerate subjects (67% versus 63%). If both probability and a
verbal recommendation was provided. Figure 4.5(d), the pattern looks pretty much as the
pattern in the Probability condition. However, the differences between high and low numerate
subjects are more pronounced when the forecast implies to take the risk (81% versus 70%).
When the forecast implies to take the cost, high numerate subjects are only slightly more
likely to follow the forecast than low numerate subjects (94% versus 92%).
Overall, it appears that high numerate subjects are more likely to comply with the
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Figure 4.5 Proportion of Subjects Who Take the Risk by Numeracy
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forecast than low numerate subjects. The effect of numeracy seems particularly strong in the
Recommendation condition. Table 4.4 presents estimated panel logistic regression models
for each condition. The dependent variable in all models is 1 when the optimal action is
taken. The variable Numeracy takes the value of the subject’s numeracy score. The estimates
confirm our previous observations: There is a strong positive effect of numeracy on compliance
in the Recommendation and the Both condition. Both coefficients are highly significant. In
the Probability condition we find a smaller and weakly significant effect of numeracy on
compliance. These effects still hold if we control for age, gender, education, and income (for
correlations between variables see Supplementary Material 4.F).
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Table 4.4 Effect of Numeracy on the Likelihood to Take the Optimal Action
Explanatory variable Neither Probability Recommendation Both
Numeracy 0.614∗∗ 0.090∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗(0.313) (0.049) (0.105) (0.067)
Constant −0.207 0.756∗∗∗ 0.336 0.772∗∗∗(1.363) (0.205) (0.462) (0.237)
Log-likelihood -1752 -3275 -1933 -2126
Observations 5000 6000 4700 4400
Notes. Random-effects logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p-value < 0.10, ∗∗ p-value < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p-value < 0.01, two-tailed.
Re-estimating the regression model with the pooled data from the Probability and the
Recommendation condition, adding an indicator variable for the Recommendation condition
crossed with Numeracy we find that numeracy skills are significantly more important in the
Recommendation condition than in the Probability condition (p = 0.006). Repeating this
analysis with the pooled data from the Recommendation condition and the Both condition we
find no significant difference in the effect of numeracy on the likelihood to take the optimal
action (p = 0.241). Contrary to our initial expectation, numeracy skills matter more to forecast
compliance with recommendations than with probabilities.
In the following sections we will analyze the decisions in the Probability condition and the
Recommendation condition in more detail.
4.3.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of Probability Forecasts
In Figure 4.5(b), we can see that both high and low numerate subjects comply nearly 100%
of the time when the probability is either extremely high or extremely low. But for moderate
levels of P (between about 30% and 75%) there is substantial deviation from compliance for
both high and low numerate subjects. Both high and low numerate subjects tend to take the
cost well below the optimal threshold of 75%. We might hypothesize that the explanation
for this pattern is driven by risk aversion. The number of boxes collected in the BRET
is a good proxy for subjects’ risk appetite. Assuming the constant relative risk aversion
utility function u(x) = xr and given the implied levels of r based on the number of boxes
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Figure 4.6 Proportion of Subjects Who Take the Risk in the Probability Condition
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collected (see Crosetto and Filippin 2013, Appendix A), we can calculate the expected utility
maximizing decision for each subject and each value of P . The result is depicted in Figure 4.6
(averaged over subjects and 5-percentage-point blocks) and indicates that risk aversion alone
is not sufficient to explain the observed pattern. Instead, it appears that many subjects,
independent of numeracy, fail to follow the optimal strategy when P gets above 50%.
Interestingly, this also happens in the condition with both, recommendation and prob-
ability. In fact, it appears that probability information effectively chases out the benefits
of recommendation for the high numerate subjects. We present informal analysis of this in
Figure 4.7, in which we display word clouds for the four conditions based on the answers to
the questions “briefly describe how you have decided when to take the risk and when to take
the cost”. Figure 4.7(b and d) and Figure 4.7(c and d) indicate that the condition with both
probability and recommendation is much more similar to the Probability condition than to
the Recommendation condition. Observe that, for both Probability and the Both condition,
subjects explain their actions in terms of probability or percent and seemingly ignore the
advice when it is given.
Looking more closely at the answers in the Probability condition, we find that 47% of
subjects indicate that the rule they followed was to choose to take the cost when the loss
probability was above 50%, effectively ignoring the financial implications of their decisions
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Figure 4.7 Word Clouds Based on the Request to Explain How the Decisions Were Made
(a) Neither Recommendation Nor Probability (b) Probability Only
(c) Recommendation Only (d) Both Recommendation and Probability
Note. For details on the data processing for the word clouds see Supplementary Material 4.G.
which would, if correctly folded into the decision making procedure, suggest the optimal
75% cutoff. This behavior is in line with the finding by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968), who
showed that ratings of a gamble’s attractiveness were determined much more strongly by the
probabilities of winning and losing than by the expected payoff. This decision heuristic has
come to be known as proportion dominance Finucane et al. (2003) and has been replicated a
number of times (for example, Goldstein and Einhorn 1987, Ordóñez and Benson 1997).
Provided with a probability forecast, subjects seem to follow a simple decision heuristic
and compliance is only weakly correlated with numeracy.
4.3.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of Recommendation Forecasts
In Figure 4.5(c), we can see that recommendations work quite well, when the optimal decision
is to take the risk. The compliance rates of both high and low numerate subjects in the
Recommendation condition are higher than the compliance rates in the Probability condition,
when the optimal decision is to take the risk (69% versus 94% and 63% versus 71% for high
and low numerate subjects, respectively). However, the difference is only significant for high
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but not for low numerate subjects (p < 0.001 and p = 0.103, respectively). When the forecast
implies to take the cost, compliance in the Recommendation condition is significantly lower
than in the Probability condition for both high and low numerate subjects (p < 0.001).
To further explore the behavior in the Recommendation condition we will estimate panel
logistic regression models for the data in the Recommendation condition. All models use
random effects to control for the panel structure of our data. The dependent variable in all
models is 1 when the siren action (take the cost) is taken and 0 otherwise. The explanatory
variable Opt is 1 when the optimal action given the forecast corresponds to the siren action
and 0 otherwise. Therefore, (1 −Opt) is 1 when the optimal action is to take the status quo
action (take the risk). We cross the Period variable (1, . . . , 100) with the indicator variables
Opt and (1 −Opt) to capture learning effects for taking the siren action and the status quo
action, respectively.
Following Bolton and Katok (2017), we define the variable Errors to be the total number of
previous recommendations that turned out to be incorrect ex post – either the recommendation
was to take the risk but the loss did occur or the recommendation was to take the cost but
the loss did not occur. So the Errors variable is simply the cumulated number of forecast
errors observed during the game. We cross the Errors variable with the variable Opt and
with (1 −Opt) to track how subjects react to false alarms. Table 5 summarizes the estimates
of the models that we fit for each condition separately.
Model (1) takes a first look at the dynamics of the decision in the Recommendation condition
and tracks how subjects are influenced by forecast errors. Here, as in all models, the Opt
coefficient is positive, indicating that the recommendation improves decision making. However,
in Models (3) and (4), the coefficients for Opt become non-significant. We will discuss this
below. The coefficient for Opt ×Period is positive and significant, and for (1 −Opt) ×Period,
it is negative and significant in all models. So on aggregate and with experience subjects learn
to take the cost more often when it is optimal to do so and less often when it is not. The
coefficient for Opt×Errors is negative and significant and the coefficient for (1−Opt)×Errors
is positive and significant, indicating that subjects are less likely to trust the forecast the
more errors they observe. The more errors they observe, they take the cost less often when it
114
Chapter 4 Trusting the Forecast: The Role of Numeracy
Table 4.5 Effect of Numeracy and Forecast Errors in the Recommendation Condition
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Opt 3.246∗∗∗ 3.233∗∗∗ 0.128 0.487(0.205) (0.213) (0.314) (0.466)
Opt × Period 0.036∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
(1 −Opt) × Period −0.024∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Opt × Errors −0.105∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗(0.031) (0.037) (0.033) (0.039)
(1 −Opt) × Errors 0.072∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.054∗(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
Opt × Errors ×Numeracy 0.030∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗(0.004) (0.005)
(1 −Opt) × Errors ×Numeracy −0.009∗∗∗ 0.005(0.003) (0.004)
Opt ×Numeracy 0.166 0.017(0.183) (0.199)
(1 −Opt) ×Numeracy −0.654∗∗∗ −0.724∗∗∗(0.181) (0.192)
Constant −2.611∗∗∗ −2.684∗∗∗ −0.178 0.042(0.347) (0.367) (0.808) (0.837)
Log-likelihood -1573 -1511 -1490 -1487
Observations 4700
Notes. Random-effects logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p-value < 0.10, ∗∗ p-value < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p-value < 0.01, two-tailed.
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would be optimal to do so and more often when it is not optimal. So overall, while subjects
make better decisions with increasing experience, their compliance rate decreases with the
number of false alarms, a behavioral regularity known as the cry wolf effect (Bliss et al. 1995,
Meyer and Bitan 2002, Bolton and Katok 2017).
Next, we will analyze how numeracy influences decision making in the Recommendation
condition. In Model (2) we add the variables Opt×Errors×Numeracy and (1−Opt)×Errors×
Numeracy. The coefficient to Opt × Errors × Numeracy is positive and significant and the
coefficient to (1−Opt)×Errors×Numeracy is negative and significant, indicating that subjects
with high numeracy skills suffer less from a decrease in compliance with future forecasts as
response to previous forecast errors than subjects with low numeracy skills.
In Model (3) we add the variables Opt ×Numeracy and (1 −Opt) ×Numeracy to the set
of explanatory variables in Model (1). The coefficient to Opt × Numeracy is positive but
not significant and the coefficient to (1 −Opt) ×Numeracy is negative and significant. This
indicates that when the optimal action is to take the cost, numeracy skills have a positive
but not significant effect on the likelihood that subjects chose the siren action. However,
when the optimal action is to take the risk numeracy significantly improves performance by
lowering the likelihood to take the non-optimal siren action. In Model (3) we also see that the
coefficient to Opt becomes non-significant, indicating that recommendations do not improve
decision making per se, but require a certain level of numeracy skills. Thus, innumerate
subjects almost completely ignore the recommendation.
So far we found that numeracy skills can improve decisions in two ways: numeracy skills
increase subject’s tolerance toward false alarms (Model (2)) and they improve subject’s
compliance with status quo action (Model (3)). In the Model (4) we test both ways in one
model. The coefficients to Opt × Errors × Numeracy and to (1 − Opt) × Numeracy remain
significant, indicating that high numerate subjects suffer less from a decrease in compliance
with future siren forecasts as response to previous forecast errors and are in general more likely
to take the status quo action when it is optimal to do so than subjects with low numeracy
skills.
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4.3.5 A Hybrid Forecasting Scheme
Our results show that both probabilities and recommendations have their own behavioral
strengths and weaknesses. So the question is, if we can combine probabilities and recommen-
dations in a way to offset their major behavioral shortcomings but keep their benefits. We
designed a hybrid forecasting system that aimed to include the benefits from both types of
information. The forecast guidance always provides a recommendation, but only additionally
provides the probability of the loss event when the recommendation is to take the cost. In
other words, the recommendation for default action included recommendation only, while the
recommendation for the siren action, also added probability, by the way of an explanation.
This idea was based on our previous observations that recommendations are more successful
at inducing the default action (take the risk) and providing probabilities is more successful at
inducing the siren action (take the cost), we expect the hybrid forecast to capture most of
the benefits.
We tested the hybrid forecasting scheme in a follow-up experiment with 50 subjects
recruited on MTurk. The experimental procedure was identical to our main experiment. The
instructions for the follow-up experiment are identical to the Recommendation condition
except for one additional sentence (in italics): “Each round you will be given advice of whether
to take the cost or take the risk. If in a given round the advice is to take the cost, you will be
also given the loss probability P that pertains to that round. The advice has been determined
in a way that, on average, if you follow the advice you will earn the most money possible.
You are not required to follow the advice.” Thus, the information provided to our subjects is
identical to the Recommendation condition, when P is lower than 75% and identical to the
Both condition, when P is greater than or equal to 75%.
To analyze the success of the hybrid forecast scheme we will estimate two panel logistic
regression models one with the pooled data from the Recommendation condition and the
follow-up experiment and one with the pooled data from the Both condition and the follow-up
experiment. Both models use random effects to control for the panel structure of the data.
The estimates of the models are summarized in Table 4.6. The dependent variable is 1 when
the siren action (take the cost) is taken and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables Opt and
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Table 4.6 Comparison of the Hybrid Forecast With Recommendation and Both
Explanatory variable (1) (2)
Opt 3.552∗∗∗ 4.655∗∗∗(0.114) (0.168)
Opt ×Hybrid 1.534∗∗∗ −0.905∗∗(0.452) (0.392)
(1 −Opt) ×Hybrid −0.528 −1.777∗∗∗(0.448) (0.364)
Constant −2.676∗∗∗ −1.369∗∗∗(0.320) (0.259)
Log-likelihood -2872 -3157
Observations 9700 9400
Notes. Random-effects logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p-value < 0.10, ∗∗ p-value < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p-value < 0.01, two-tailed.
(1 −Opt) are defined as above. We add an indicator variable Hybrid that is 1 for the data
from the follow-up survey and 0 otherwise.
In Model (1) we can see that the hybrid forecast is at least as good as providing recom-
mendations in inducing compliance with the status quo action, when it is optimal. However,
compared to recommendations the hybrid forecast is significantly better in inducing the
siren action, when it is optimal. In Model (2) we can see that, compared to providing both
recommendations and probabilities the hybrid forecast is significantly better in inducing
compliance with the status quo action, when it is optimal. However, the hybrid forecast could
not unlock the full potential of providing both, when it is optimal to take the siren action.
Overall forecast compliance significantly improves (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p < 0.01).
Figure 4.8 displays the proportion of decisions to take the risk separated by the range
of numeracy scores. From the figure, we observe that the hybrid forecast guidance moves
high numerate subjects largely in the right direction but is less effective with low numerate
subjects. This indicates that improving trust in forecasting for low numerates will require a
new approach.
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Figure 4.8 Proportion of Subjects Who Take the Risk in the Hybrid Condition Separated by the Range
of Numeracy Scores
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4.4 Discussion and Managerial Implications
We analyzed how forecast guidance interacts with the quality of decisions made by forecast
users. We found that numeracy influences trust in the forecast as measured by compliance
levels, although this happens in different ways than initially anticipated. While low numerate
subjects exhibit substantially less compliance with recommendation forecasts than do high
numerates, there is only a modest positive relationship between numeracy and trust with
probability forecasts. Both high and low numerate subjects comply nearly 100% of the time
when the probability is either extremely high or extremely low. But for moderate levels of
P there is substantial deviations from compliance for both high and low numerate subjects.
The failure in compliance with probability forecasts can be attributed to effectively ignoring
the financial implications and paying too much attention to probabilities. Most subjects,
independent of numeracy, seem to follow a 50% rule of thumb, leading them to take the
cost when the loss probability exceeds 50%. We also observed that probability forecasts
overshadow recommendations, leading to substantial deviation from compliance for moderate
levels of P in the Both condition.
The results of our study must be considered within its limitations. First, the subjects were
recruited on MTurk and may not be representative for the population. However, the socio-
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demographic characteristics of our sample approximately resemble those of the population
reported in the 2010 United States census. Second, the experiment used a context-free
cost-loss game that differs from reality in several important ways. While the design of study
allows us to control for context-dependent biases and therefore increases internal validity, it
clearly diminishes external validity. Analyzing how our findings translate to specific contexts
and the real world we leave to future research.
The limitations notwithstanding, our study provides a clearer understanding of how forecast
guidance interacts with the quality of decisions made by forecast users. We also shed light on
the role of numeracy in this interaction. Our findings on behavior may lead to new ideas on
how to design forecast guidance and stimulate future research. One promising approach to
improve forecast compliance could be the use of graphical displays of numerical information.
Graphs summarize and present numerical information in an alternative, but not less precise
way. Especially, so-called pictographs seem to be a promising tool for communicating risk to
persons with higher and lower numeracy (Galesic et al. 2009, Hess et al. 2011). Pictographs
represented by icons showing the frequency of a loss event can be used to illustrate magnitude
and convey the notion of randomness (Nelson et al. 2008). Analyzing the effectiveness of such
pictographs or other visual displays in a cost-loss game offers interesting opportunities that
we leave to future research.
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4.A On-Screen Instructions
These were the on-screen instructions that were shown to the subjects upon accessing the
experiment.2 In this condition, the subjects received both probability and recommendation.
When subjects were only given probability, the paragraphs detailing the recommendation were
removed (paragraph with dotted border). When the subjects were only given recommendation,
the details of the probability were removed (paragraph with solid border). When the subjects
were given neither probability nor recommendation, they were only provided with the loss
probability across all rounds. The payment information were identical across all conditions.
Payment Information
We want you to give us your best and honest answers to the questions that follow. We value
your participation, and offer an incentive on top of the amount you will be paid for this
HIT (if you answer the comprehension questions correctly). We will pay it out as a bonus in
Mechanical Turk.
During this survey you will play 100 rounds of a game from which you can earn money.
Your profits in this game are expressed in tokens. At the end of the survey the sum of your
profits will be converted into U.S. dollars at a rate of $1 per 3,000 tokens; the more tokens
you earn, the more money you will make.
After they game you will answer some questions from which you can earn additional money.
2Our instructions are similar to the instructions in Bolton and Katok (2017).
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We are academics at a business school, and we always pay as promised. We believe that
compensating you is important and also fair, and we hope that you will participate in our
future studies.
Instructions
At the beginning of each round of the game, you are given a credit of 150 tokens. You must
then decide whether to take the risk or take the cost. If your decision is to take the risk,
there is some probability P of incurring a loss of 100 tokens. If your decision is to take the
cost, you incur a cost of 75 tokens for certain.
Take the risk Take the cost
-100 tokens 0 tokens
-75 tokensP 100% – P 
Your profit depends on your decision and on whether the loss occurs.
If you take the risk, then either:
Your profit = 150 − 100 = 50 tokens if the loss occurs
or
Your profit = 150 tokens if the loss does not occur.
If you take the cost, then
Your profit = 150 − 75 = 75 tokens regardless of whether the loss occurs or not.
You will play 100 rounds of the game. The probability of loss (P) varies from round-to-round.
To determine whether the loss actually occurs in a round, the computer will generate a
random number between 0% and 100%, with each number in this range equally likely. If the
random number is below or equal to the loss probability for that round, the loss occurs; if it
is above the loss probability, the loss does not occur.
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For example, suppose the loss probability P for the round is 60%. If the random number
comes out to be 65%, the loss does not occur. If the random number comes out to be 40%,
the loss occurs.
Information to help you decide
While the loss probability P varies from round-to-round, the average loss probability across
all rounds is 50%.
Each round you will be given the loss probability P that pertains to that round.
Each round you will be given advice of whether to take the cost or take the risk. The
advice has been determined in a way that, on average, if you follow the advice you will
earn the most money possible. You are not required to follow the advice.
Note that the advice does not guarantee that you will make the most money possible in
any given round. It is possible that when the advice is take the risk, the loss does occur.
It is also possible that the advice is to take the cost, and the loss does not occur.
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4.B Comprehension Questions
In this section, we provide the questions and answers from the quiz that our subjects had
to pass before they could continue with the main part of the experiment. Out of the 337
subjects who started the quiz, 110 subjects (32.6%) could not answer all questions correctly
on the first attempt and were therefore screened out. Out of the 110 subjects who failed the
quiz, four subjects had only one correct answer, eleven subjects had two correct answers, 22
subjects had three correct answers, and 73 subjects had four correct answers. We do not find
any significant differences in the failure rates across treatments (χ2(3) = 1.2872, p = 0.732).
To make sure that the instructions are clear, please answer the following comprehension
questions.
(1) The loss probability P varies from round-to-round.⊙ True
# False
(2) What is the average loss probability across all rounds?
# 40%⊙ 50%
# 60%
# 65%
(3) If you take the risk, then your profit...⊙ . . . depends of whether the loss occurs.
# . . . is independent of whether the loss occurs.
(4) If you take the cost, then your profit...
# . . . depends of whether the loss occurs.⊙ . . . is independent of whether the loss occurs.
(5) How many rounds will you play?
# 25
# 50
# 75⊙ 100
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4.C Screen Shots
Decision Screen
Result Screen
125
Chapter 4 Trusting the Forecast: The Role of Numeracy
4.D The Bomb Risk Elicitation Task
In this section, we provide the instructions and results of the BRET (Crosetto and Filippin
2013), that subjects completed after the main part of the experiment.
Instructions
Below you see a field composed of 100 numbered boxes. Exactly one of these 100 boxes
contains a bomb. You do not know the bomb’s location. You only know that it is equally
likely to be in any of the 100 boxes.
Your task is to choose how many boxes to collect. Boxes will be collected in numerical order.
So you will be asked to choose a number between 1 and 100.
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 
After you have confirmed your decision the computer will randomly determine the number of
the box containing the bomb.
∎ If you happen to have collected the box where the bomb is located – i.e. if your chosen
number is greater than or equal to the drawn number – you will earn zero.
∎ If the bomb is located in a box that you did not collect – i.e. if your chosen number is
smaller than the drawn number – you will earn 10 cents for each collected box.
On the next screen you will be asked to indicate how many boxes you would like to collect.
You confirm your choice by clicking ‘Continue’.
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To make sure that the instructions are clear, please answer the following short quiz.
Suppose that the bomb is located in box 25. How much will you earn, if you collect . . .
(a) . . . 21 boxes _____
(b) . . . 38 boxes _____
(c) . . . 62 boxes _____
(d) . . . 79 boxes _____
Suppose that the bomb is located in box 75. How much will you earn, if you collect . . .
(a) . . . 21 boxes _____
(b) . . . 38 boxes _____
(c) . . . 62 boxes _____
(d) . . . 79 boxes _____
The location of the bomb depends on how many boxes you decide to collect.
# Yes
# No
Results
Figure 4.9 shows the distribution of the number of collected boxes in the BRET. The mean
number of boxes collected is 35.0 (SD = 16.1).
Figure 4.9 Distribution of Risk Appetite
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4.E Post-Experimental Questionnaire
(1) What is your age?
(2) What is your gender?
# Male
# Female
(3) What is your primary language
(i.e., the one you speak most of the time)?
(4) What is the highest level of education you
have completed?
# Less than high school degree
# High school graduate (high school
diploma or equivalent including GED)
# Vocational/technical school
# Some college but no degree
# Bachelor’s degree
# Master’s degree
# Doctoral degree (PhD)
# Advanced professional degree (JD,MD, etc.)
(5) Which category best describes your major?3
# Arts and Humanities
(Arts, Language, Literature, History, Philosophy, etc.)
# Business
(Accounting, Finance,Marketing, etc.)
# Engineering and Computer Science
(Civil, Electrical,Mechanical, etc.)
# Health and Medicine
(Medicine, Nursing, PublicHealth, etc.)
# Natural Sciences and Mathematics
(Biology, Chemistry,Maths, Physics, etc.)
# Social Sciences
(Communication, Economics, Politics, Psychology, Sociology, etc.)
# Other (please specify):
(6) How would you best describe your current
employment status?
# Working (paid employee)
# Working (self-employed)
# Not working (temporary layoff from a job)
# Not working (looking for work)
# Not working (retired)
# Not working (disabled)
# Not working (other):
(7) Please indicate the category that best de-
scribes your own annual income from all
sources before taxes.
# $10,000 and under
# $10,001 to $20,000
# $20,001 to $30,000
# $30,001 to $40,000
# $40,001 to $50,000
# $50,001 to $60,000
# $60,001 to $70,000
# $70,001 to $80,000
# $80,001 to $90,000
# $90,001 to $100,000
# $100,001 to $150,000
# over $150,000
3Question 5 was displayed only if the answer to Question 4 was Bachelor’s degree or higher.
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4.F Correlations Between Variables
We collected data on subjects’ numeracy skills and risk preferences; and asked for additional
demographic information, including highest level of education completed and own annual
income from all sources before taxes. Responses to these questions were categorical. For
Education, 0 equals “less than high school degree,” 1 equals “high school graduate (high school
diploma or equivalent including GED),” 2 equals “vocational/technical school,” 3 equals
“some college but no degree,” 4 equals “bachelor’s degree,” 5 equals “master’s degree,” 6 equals
“doctoral degree (PhD),” and 7 equals “advanced professional degree (JD,MD, etc.).” For
Income, 0 equals “$10,000 and under,” 1 equals “$10,001 to $20,000,” 2 equals “$20,001 to
$30,000,” . . . 9 equals “$90,001 to $100,000,” 10 equals “$100,001 to $150,000,” and 11 equals
“over $150,000.”
Correlations between variables are provided in Table 4.7. Numeracy scores were higher
for men as well as for more educated people in our sample. Incomes were higher for more
educated people.
Table 4.7 Correlations Between Variables
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean (SD)
1. Numeracy — 3.74 (1.84)
2. Risk appetitea −.02 — 34.95 (16.07)
3. Age .01 −.08 — 34.98 (10.90)
4. Education .31 −.02 .12 — 3.44 (1.24)
5. Genderb −.22 .03 .06 .02 — 0.55 (0.50)
6. Income .07 .04 .09 .24 −.13 — 3.09 (2.53)
Notes. Coefficients printed in bold are significant (p < 0.01), all others are not significant at any level.
anumber of boxes collected in Crosetto and Filippin’s (2013) risk elicitation task.
b0=male, 1= female.
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4.G Data Processing for Word Clouds
The first step of our data processing was to remove punctuation, extra white spaces, and
special characters; and convert the text to lower case. After this initial data cleaning, we
substituted words and phrases to correct for spelling mistakes and to group words with similar
meaning. The substitutions are shown in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8 Substitutions
Substitute Substituendum Substitute Substituendum Substitute Substituendum
30 30s gain gained, gaining realize realized
40 40s gamble gambled reason reasoned, reasoning
60 60ish general generally regret regretted
85 high85 generate generated, generating reliable proved, turned
90 90s guess guessing, predict report reports
a lot alot happen happened, happening result results
action actions help helped risk riash, risks
actual actually hope hopes, hoping risk would riskwould
advice advices, advised, adviser,
advisor, reccomendations,
recomendation,
recommendation,
recommendations,
recommended, suggested,
suggestion, suggestions
intuition gut, gut feeling, instinct,
intuitive
round rounds
agree agreed keep keeping run ran
alternate alternated know knew, knowing safe safer, save
always every round, every time,
everytime
lead led scare scared
always with every timewith learn learned search searching
answer answers listen listened seem seemed, seems
attempt attempts load loads select selected
average averages look looked show showed, shown
balance balanced lose loosing, loses, losing, lost significant significantly
based bases loss losses situation situations
become becoming loss and lossand sometimes occasionally, rarely
begin began luck lucky start started
benefit beneficial, benefiting make made, making statistical statistically
cancel cancelled maximize maximizing stay stayed
chance chances, shot mean means stick stuck
change changed, changing mostly mainly, most of the time,
normally, ordinarily,
typically, usually
straight
forward
though
straightforward-
though
choice choices non loss nonlosses streak streaks
choose choosing, chose notice noticed, noticing successive successively
click clicked number numbers suspicious suspiciously
collect collecting occasion occasions switch switched
Finally, we removed common stop words like “a”, “and”, “the”, etc.. The list of stop
words is shown in Table 4.9. Table 4.10 shows the most common words that subjects used
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Table 4.9 Stopwords
a between gave know on than unless whereupon
able bro get known only that until wherever
about but getting last or thats up whether
across by give latter other the upon which
after came given least out their us while
again certain go less over them v whither
against come going let own then very who
all could got like per there via whoever
almost did had look probably thereafter vs whole
along didnt have me provided therefor want whom
also do he mean provides theres wanted whose
although does help might rather they wants why
am doesnt here more regardless think was will
an doing how most right third wasnt with
and done i much said this way within
another dont id must same those well without
any down if my saw though went would
anyways each ill myself second three were woulda
around either im near see through what wouldnt
as even in never seem throughout whatever wouldve
at except instead next should to when x
be far into no so too whence yet
because few is non some took whenever you
been first isnt not somehow toward where your
being for it now still try whereafter yours
below forth its of sure twice whereas yourself
best four itself off take two whereby yourselves
better from just often taken under wherein
to describe how they have decided when to take the risk and when to take the cost. The
table also shows the proportion of subjects per treatment who used the corresponding word
to describe their strategy.
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Table 4.10 Common Words Used by Subjects to Describe Their Strategy
Word Neither Probability Recommendation Both
risk 74.0 80.0 42.6 54.5
percent 18.0 80.0 6.4 68.2
cost 42.0 43.3 29.8 40.9
50 20.0 48.3 10.6 38.6
probability 8.0 53.3 6.4 36.4
loss 30.0 28.3 14.9 34.1
advice 0.0 0.0 63.8 29.5
mostly 18.0 15.0 23.4 22.7
always 30.0 10.0 21.3 4.5
taking 28.0 6.7 19.1 9.1
time 28.0 6.7 21.3 6.8
decide 18.0 18.3 14.9 6.8
choose 18.0 10.0 8.5 15.9
feel 4.0 11.7 14.9 13.6
occur 18.0 10.0 4.3 9.1
follow 0.0 0.0 31.9 11.4
sometimes 10.0 6.7 4.3 13.6
chance 8.0 6.7 4.3 13.6
lose 12.0 6.7 6.4 4.5
intuition 4.0 8.3 6.4 11.4
random 16.0 5.0 6.4 0.0
anything 2.0 15.0 2.1 6.8
profit 18.0 1.7 4.3 2.3
75 14.0 5.0 2.1 4.5
average 14.0 1.7 10.6 0.0
above 0.0 11.7 0.0 13.6
round 10.0 3.3 8.5 4.5
win 18.0 0.0 2.1 2.3
token 10.0 1.7 8.5 2.3
lower 0.0 11.7 0.0 6.8
60 0.0 11.7 0.0 6.8
based 4.0 1.7 4.3 11.4
guaranteed 16.0 0.0 2.1 0.0
happen 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Conclusion
In this dissertation, we applied behavioral economic engineering approaches to improve
decision making. In the three main chapters of the dissertation, we analyzed how different
performance metrics, supply contracts, and forms of forecast guidance affect human decision
making and how we can improve performance. This chapter summarizes the key results of
the three main chapters and provides directions for future research.
In Chapter 2, we analyzed how performance metrics used in inventory management affect
human decision making. We considered two equivalent inventory metrics, days of supply and
inventory turn rate. While the relationship between days of supply and inventory value is
linear, inventory turn rate and inventory value have a reciprocal (non-linear) relationship.
Human decision makers use differences in these metrics to estimate inventory reduction. As a
result inventory reductions that are evaluated based on inventory turn rate are over-valued.
This misperception can be avoided by using days of supply instead of inventory turn rate.
In our first study, we showed that using the days of supply metric improves performance in
investment decisions compared to using the inventory turn rate metric and that this effect
persists with experience. In our second study, we showed that this misperception can cause
subjects to work harder at reducing inventory. In a real effort task, subjects invested 28% more
effort under the inventory turn rate metric than under the days of supply metric. In our third
study, individuals chose higher order cost under the inventory turn rate metric than under
the days of supply metric. We also found that subjects with high cognitive reflection more
frequently decide optimally than those with low cognitive reflection. Thus, if the behavioral
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superior metric cannot be used, decision making can still be improved by activating System
2 thinking of the decision makers. This can be supported, for instance, by reducing the
emotional and cognitive load, by avoiding time pressure, and by avoiding multi-tasking during
decision making. Overall, however, our findings suggest that debiasing the decision maker
(activating System 2 thinking) is less beneficial than debiasing the environment (choosing the
right metric).
In Chapter 3, we analyzed human decision making under service level and under wholesale
price contracts. We showed that service level contracts can be parameterized, such that
they have steep expected profit functions, relative to other commonly studied contracts such
as the wholesale price contract. We argued that this property increases the salience of the
actual costs and induces a debiasing effect. As a result, under the steep service level contract,
the average order quantity was 66% closer to optimality and standard deviation of order
quantities was 42% lower than under a mathematically comparable wholesale contract. In our
experiment, the efficiency that human subjects achieved under a service level contract was
almost 10% higher than the achieved efficiency under a wholesale price contract. Efficiency
under the wholesale price contract was even lower than that of the mean demand heuristic
(ordering the expected demand in every period), albeit not significantly. Thus, ignoring
underage and overage costs and ordering mean demand in each period would result in a
similar efficiency to what subjects achieved in the lab under a wholesale price contract. These
results highlight that it is important to consider aspects of human behavior when designing
supply contracts.
In Chapter 4, we analyzed compliance rates (trust) for forecast guidance provided as
probabilities as well as recommendations in a simple take-the-risk or take-the-cost decision
game. We found that high numerate subjects are more likely to comply with the forecast
than low numerate subjects. Nevertheless the observed behavior in our study was contrary to
our initial expectations in important ways. First, low numerate subjects exhibit substantially
less compliance with recommendation forecasts than do high numerates. Second, there is
only a modest positive relationship between subjects’ numeracy skills and trust in probability
forecasts. Both high and low numerate subjects complied nearly 100% of the time when the
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probability was either extremely high or extremely low. But for moderate levels of the loss
probability (between about 25% and 75%) there was substantial deviation from compliance
for both high and low numerate subjects. We found that, when given probability information,
subjects followed a 50% rule of thumb (taking the cost when the loss probability was above
50%), leading to systematic biases. Subjects seem to ignore financial implications (compare
Chapter 3) and pay too much attention to probabilities, which can be seen as a proxy attribute
(Chapter 2). Our results show that both probabilities and recommendations have their own
behavioral strengths and weaknesses. We designed a hybrid forecasting system that blends
probabilities and recommendations in a way to offset the major behavioral shortcomings. We
observed that the new design moves high numerates largely in the right direction but is less
effective with low numerates.
The field of behavioral operations explores how individuals make decisions in operations
contexts and how those decisions compare to normative predictions of analytical models.
We have shown that human decision makers often do not give financial implications full
consideration or even ignore them, especially in situation in which the economic consequences
of deviating from normative predictions are less severe. We have also shown how behavioral
economic engineering can help to improve decision making, given a better understanding
of behavioral regularities. Investigating how existing behavioral theory translates to the
operations domain and identifying behavioral regularities is important part of future research
in behavioral operations. However, research in behavioral operations should go one step
further and also aim to design mechanisms that take behavioral aspects into account in order
to improve human decision making in operations contexts. Controlled laboratory experiments
are a great starting point to design and test mechanisms. The next step would be to test the
proposed designs in the real world, because successful mechanisms in the lab can fail in the
field. Therefore, conducting field experiments to further test the robustness of mechanisms is
an important step for future research in the field of behavioral operations.
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